诉讼风险、审计师选择与盈余质量

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (5): 58-65.

诉讼风险、审计师选择与盈余质量

邵毅平, 李文贵

浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2018-01-11 出版日期:2018-05-10 发布日期:2018-05-08
作者简介:邵毅平(1963-),女,浙江兰溪人,浙江财经大学会计学院教授;李文贵(1982-),女,重庆江津人,浙江财经大学会计学院副教授。
基金资助:
浙江省哲学社科规划重点课题(17NDJC025Z);国家自然科学基金资助项目(71502161);教育部人文社科规划项目(15YJA630054)

Litigation Risk, Auditor Choice and Earnings Quality

SHAO Yiping, LI Wengui

School of Accounting,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou 310018,China

Received:2018-01-11 Online:2018-05-10 Published:2018-05-08

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文分析诉讼风险对企业审计师选择决策的影响及其经济后果。检验发现,面临更高诉讼风险的企业,选择高质量审计师的概率越低。同时,高诉讼风险企业披露的盈余信息质量显著更差。但是,如果高诉讼风险企业选择了高质量审计师,那么诉讼风险对盈余质量不再具有显著影响。这表明,高质量审计师能有效缓解诉讼风险对盈余质量的消极效应,提升高诉讼企业的信息披露质量。上述结论为诉讼风险的经济后果提供了新的解释,也进一步丰富和拓展了有关审计师选择决策影响因素的研究。

关键词: 诉讼风险, 审计师选择, 盈余质量

Abstract: This paper analyzes the effect of litigation risk on firms' audit choice and its economic consequence. We find that there is a significantly negative relation between litigation risk and auditor choice, and the earnings quality of firms facing high litigation risk is much lower than that of other firms. Further tests demonstrate that if those firms facing high litigation risk could employ high-quality auditors, the litigation risk no longer has significant effect on their earnings quality. Those results show that firms facing high litigation risk prefer to employ low-quality auditors, but high-quality auditors are helpful for firms with high litigation risk to improve their earnings quality.

Key words: Litigation Risk, Auditor Choice, Earnings Quality

中图分类号:

F239.4

邵毅平, 李文贵. 诉讼风险、审计师选择与盈余质量[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(5): 58-65.

SHAO Yiping, LI Wengui. Litigation Risk, Auditor Choice and Earnings Quality[J]. , 2018, 34(5): 58-65.

参考文献

[1] 林斌, 周美华, 舒伟. 内部控制、公司诉讼与债务契约——基于A股市场的经验研究[J]. 审计与经济研究, 2015,(3): 3-11.
[2] 罗党论, 聂超颖. 法律诉讼、银企关系与企业融资[J]. 金融学季刊, 2013, (7): 120-136.
[3] Arena, M., Julio, B. Litigation Risk, Cash Holdings and Corporate Investment [Z]. Working Paper, 2011.
[4] McTier, B. C., Wald, J. K. The Causes and Consequences of Securities Class Action Litigation [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance, 2011, 17(3): 649-665.
[5] 潘越, 潘健平, 戴亦一.公司诉讼风险、司法地方保护主义与企业创新[J]. 经济研究, 2015, (3): 131-146.
[6] 林斌, 周美华, 舒伟.内部控制、公司诉讼与公司价值[J]. 中国会计评论, 2013, (4): 431-456.
[7] 王彦超, 林斌, 辛清泉.市场环境、民事诉讼与盈余管理[J]. 中国会计评论, 2008, (1): 21-40.
[8] Ojala, H. T, Collis, J., Kinunen, J., Niemi, L., Troberg, P. The Demand for Voluntary Audit in Micro-Companies: Evidence from Finland [J]. International Journal of Auditing, 2016, Forthcoming.
[9] 毛新述, 孟杰.内部控制与诉讼风险[J]. 管理世界, 2013, (11): 155-165.
[10] Titman, S., Trueman B. Information Quality and the Valuation of New Issues [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1986, 8(1): 159-172.
[11] Barton, J. Who Cares about Auditor's Reputation？ [J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2003, 22(3): 549-586.
[12] Allen, F., J. Qian, M.J. Qian. Law, Finance, and Economic Growth in China [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 77(1): 57-116.
[13] 朱松, 陈关亭, 黄小琳.集中持股下的独立审计作用:基于债券市场信用评级的分析 [J]. 会计研究, 2013, (7):86-93.
[14] 朱红军, 夏立军, 陈信元. 转型经济中审计市场的需求特征研究[J]. 审计研究, 2004, (5): 53-62.
[15] DeAngelo, L.E. Auditor Size and Audit Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 1981, 3 (3): 181-199.
[16] Malm, J., Mobbs S. Independent Directors and Corporate Litigation [Z]. Working Paper, 2014.
[17] Scott, R. W. Financial Accounting Theory [M]. New Jersey:Prentice-Hall Inc, 2003.
[18] DuCharme, L., Malatesta P., Sefcik S. Earnings Management,Stock Issues and Shareholder Lawsuits [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2004, 71(1): 27-49.
[19] Lu, Y. Earnings Management and Securities Litigation [D]. Ph.D Thesis,Stanford University, 2004.
[20] 祝继高, 会计稳健性与债权人利益保护——基于银行与上市公司关于贷款的法律诉讼的研究 [J]. 会计研究, 2011, (5): 50-57.
[21] Fung, S., Gul, F., Krishnan, J. City-level Auditor Industry Specialization, Economies of Scale, and Audit Pricing [J]. The Accounting Review, 2012, 87 (4): 1281-1307.
[22] Kothari, S. P., Leone, A.J., Wasley, C. E. Performance Matched Discretionary Accrual Measures [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2005, 39 (1): 163-197.
[23] 范经华, 张雅曼, 刘启亮. 内部控制、审计师行业专长、应计与真实盈余关联[J]. 会计研究, 2013, (4): 81-89.
[24] Wang, Q., Wong, T. J., Xia. L. State Ownership, the Institutional Environment, and Auditor Choice [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2008, 46(1): 112-134.
[25] 孙健, 王百强, 曹丰, 刘向强.公司战略影响盈余管理吗[J]. 管理世界, 2016, (3): 160-169.
[26] 刘启亮, 郭俊秀, 汤雨颜. 会计事务所组织形式、法律责任与审计质量[J]. 会计研究, 2015, (4): 86-94.