董事网络中心度对大股东掏空的影响:抑制还是加剧？

财经论丛 ›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (11): 85-92.

董事网络中心度对大股东掏空的影响:抑制还是加剧？

左雪莲¹, 郝云宏², 王淑贤³

1.浙江工商大学浙商研究中心,浙江杭州 310018;
2.浙江工商大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州 310018;
3.浙江工商大学杭州商学院,浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2018-01-23 出版日期:2018-11-10 发布日期:2018-11-12
作者简介:左雪莲(1983-),女,安徽宣城人,浙江工商大学浙商研究中心博士生;郝云宏(1962-),男,陕西宜川人,浙江工商大学工商管理学院教授,博士;王淑贤(1965-),女,陕西宜君人,浙江工商大学杭州商学院教授。
基金资助:
浙江省社科规划项目(15JDZS01Z);国家自然科学基金项目(71272143);浙江省自然科学基金项目(Y16G020007);浙江省人文社科基地项目(JYTgs20161101)

The Influence of the Director Network Centrality on Large Shareholders Tunneling:Restrain or Intensify?

ZUO Xuelian¹, HAO Yunhong², WANG Shuxian³

1.Zheshang Research Center,Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018,China;
2.School of Business Administration,Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018, China;
3.Hangzhou College of Commerce, Zhejiang Gongshang University,Hangzhou 310018,China

Received:2018-01-23 Online:2018-11-10 Published:2018-11-12

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 从社会网络视角实证分析董事网络对大股东掏空行为的影响机制,并考虑产权性质的权变因素。研究结果表明:董事网络中心度与大股东掏空程度呈显著的U型关系,揭示了董事网络在大股东掏空治理中的“双刃剑”作用,进一步地,把样本分为国有企业和民营企业进行分组回归,发现这种U型关系在民营企业中表现得更为显著。另外,研究还发现,我国上市公司董事网络中心度普遍偏高,存在“过度连锁”的现象。研究为企业及监管部门规范董事兼任行为、抑制大股东掏空、增强投资者保护提供了新的经验证据和实践参考。

关键词: 董事网络, 网络中心度, 掏空, 社会资本, 产权性质

Abstract: This paper empirically analyzes the relationship between the director network and tunneling from the perspective of social network and in light of the moderating effect of property rights. The results of the research indicate that the director network centrality is significantly U-type related to the tunneling level, which reveals the “double-edged sword” function of the director network in the governance of tunneling of major shareholders. When the samples are further divided into state-owned and private-owned enterprises for grouping regression, it is found that the U-type relationship is more significant in private-owned enterprises. In addition, the study also finds that the director network centrality of listed companies is generally of a high level and there exists the phenomenon of “excessive chain” . The study provides new empirical evidence and practical reference for enterprises and regulatory authorities to regulate the behavior of director interlocking, restrain the tunneling of large shareholders and enhance investors protection.

Key words: Director Network, Network Centrality, Tunneling, Social Capital, Property Right

中图分类号:

F276

左雪莲, 郝云宏, 王淑贤. 董事网络中心度对大股东掏空的影响:抑制还是加剧？[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(11): 85-92.

ZUO Xuelian, HAO Yunhong, WANG Shuxian. The Influence of the Director Network Centrality on Large Shareholders Tunneling:Restrain or Intensify?[J]. , 2018, 34(11): 85-92.

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