管理层权力、东道国制度环境与进入模式选择

财经论丛 ›› 2019, Vol. 35 ›› Issue (2): 74-84.

管理层权力、东道国制度环境与进入模式选择

丁婉玲¹, 何朋¹, 杜健²

1.深圳大学管理学院,广东深圳 518000;
2.浙江大学管理学院,浙江杭州 310058

收稿日期:2018-06-14 出版日期:2019-02-10 发布日期:2019-01-28
作者简介:丁婉玲(1983-),女,重庆市人,深圳大学管理学院讲师,博士;何朋(1993-),男,安徽桐城人,深圳大学管理学院硕士生;杜健(1978-),女,河北唐山人,浙江大学管理学院副教授,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402098);广东省教育厅青年创新人才类项目(2014WQNCX076);国家自然科学基金面上项目(71672176;71772130)

Managerial Power, Institutional Environment and Entry Mode

DING Wanling¹, HE Peng¹, DU Jian²

1. School of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518000, China;
2. School of Management, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou 310058, China

Received:2018-06-14 Online:2019-02-10 Published:2019-01-28

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文从代理理论视角研究了我国上市公司管理层权力对海外市场进入模式选择的影响关系,以我国沪、深两市2013~2016年A股284家上市公司的540个对外直接投资事件为样本进行实证分析。研究结果表明:管理层权力越大越倾向于选择资源承诺水平更高的海外市场进入模式。本研究进一步检验了东道国制度环境对这一关系的影响,研究发现,合资与并购两种进入模式相比,当东道国制度环境越完善时,管理层权力越高,其选择并购的可能性更大。本研究的启示意义在于,企业在进行海外市场进入模式选择的决策制定时,管理层会运用他们所拥有的权力影响进入模式选择,管理层权力越大越有可能采取更为激进的进入模式策略。

关键词: 管理层权力, 进入模式, 制度环境

Abstract: This paper studies the influence of top managers' managerial power on the choice of overseas market entry mode from the perspective of the agent theory. By analyzing the data of 540 outward foreign direct investment events of 284 Chinese listed companies in 2013~2016, we find that managerial power of top managers is a positive predictor of choosing overseas market entry mode with higher market commitment. This study further examines the impact of the host country's institutional environment on the relationship between the managerial power and the overseas market entry mode choice. The empirical testing results show that compared with joint venture and M&A, when the host country's institutional environment is better, the greater the managerial power, the more likely for the company to choose M&A. The practice implication of this study is to remind owners of companies that they should pay more attention to the influence of top managers' managerial power on the choice of overseas market entry mode and help them monitor the decision making process more effectively.

Key words: Managerial Power, Entry Mode, Institutional Environment

中图分类号:

F272.3

丁婉玲, 何朋, 杜健. 管理层权力、东道国制度环境与进入模式选择[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(2): 74-84.

DING Wanling, HE Peng, DU Jian. Managerial Power, Institutional Environment and Entry Mode[J]. , 2019, 35(2): 74-84.

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