关键词: 银行贷款担保, 审计功能, 审计师特征, 产权歧视, 市场化发展

Abstract: Bank loans are the main channel of external financing for non-financial enterprises. Audit, as a significant mechanism of enterprise external governance, should play an intermediary market role in banks' credit decisions-making. Based on the data of Listed Companies in China's stock market,this paper examines the audit function and the efficiency of bank loan guarantee under different circumstances. The results are as follows:First,the banks require higher proportion of loan guarantee for companies with modified audit opinions,which means the audit intermediary function is effective. Secondly,considering the property rights of enterprises,the implicit government guarantee of state-owned enterprises has a high substitution effect on audit function,in which the banks' property right discrimination seriously weakens the audit intermediary function. However, the market development can only alleviate but cannot eliminate this substitution effect. Furthermore, the banks have choice sensitivity to the heterogeneity characteristics of auditors,and they can identify the audit report increment information under different firm size and tenure,and different auditor individual tenure circumstances,and adjust credit decision-making. But they are not sensitive to the characteristics of the individual role and the expertise of auditors. This paper expands the research of bank behaviors from the perspective of auditing,and provides empirical evidence and policy reference for audit service to promote the development of financial market.

Key words: Bank Loan Guarantee, Audit Function, Auditor Characteristics, Property Right Discrimination, Market Development