多个大股东与企业社会责任

财经论丛 ›› 2020, Vol. 36 ›› Issue (10): 64-74.

多个大股东与企业社会责任

冯晓晴¹, 文雯², 靳毓^{3, 4}

1.中国人民大学商学院,北京 100872;
2.北京外国语大学国际商学院,北京 100089;
3.中国人民大学书报资料中心,北京 100872;
4.中南财经政法大学财政税务学院,湖北武汉 430073

收稿日期:2020-01-13 出版日期:2020-10-10 发布日期:2020-10-14
通讯作者: 冯晓晴(1993-),女,内蒙古赤峰人,中国人民大学商学院博士生;文雯(1991-),女,安徽芜湖人,北京外国语大学国际商学院讲师,博士。
作者简介:靳毓(1980-),女,河北保定人,中国人民大学书报资料中心副编审,中南财经政法大学财政税务学院博士生。
基金资助:
北京市社会科学基金项目(19YJC040);中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助(2018QD012;2019JT004);北京外国语大学一流学科建设资助项目(YY19ZZB006);北京高校中国特色社会主义理论研究协同创新中心(北京外国语大学)阶段性成果

Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Social Responsibility

FENG Xiaoqing¹, WEN Wen², JIN Yu^{3, 4}

1. Business School, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
2. International Business School, Beijing Foreign Studies University, Beijing 100089, China;
3. Information Center For Social Sciences, Renmin University of China, Beijing 100872, China;
4. School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China

Received:2020-01-13 Online:2020-10-10 Published:2020-10-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 多个大股东的股权结构安排可以对管理层形成有效监督,抑制管理层私利行为。基于2007~2017年我国沪深A股上市公司的样本,实证检验多个大股东的股权结构对企业社会责任绩效的影响。研究表明,多个大股东的股权结构能够显著提高企业社会责任绩效,除控股股东之外的大股东数量越多、持股比例之和越高,社会责任绩效越好。经过工具变量法、倾向评分匹配法、Heckman两阶段模型控制内生性问题后,结论依然成立。进一步研究发现,多个大股东对企业社会责任的正面影响在内部信息透明度更高、外部法制环境更薄弱的公司中更显著,说明多个大股东的股权结构作为一种内部监督机制在一定程度上与外部治理呈现替代关系。此外,多个大股东通过改善企业社会责任绩效提升了企业的长期价值。

关键词: 多个大股东, 企业社会责任, 信息透明度, 法制环境, 企业价值

Abstract: Multiple large shareholders can play an effective monitoring role. Based on a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2007 to 2017, this study empirically tests the impact of multiple large shareholders (MLS) on corporate social responsibility (CSR). The results reveal that MLS have a positive impact on CSR performance. CSR performance significantly improves when the number and share percentage of MLS increase. The results remain unchanged with the instrumental variable approach, the propensity score matching method and the Heckman two-stage model. Further analyses show that the positive effect of MLS on CSR performance is more pronounced in firms with higher internal information transparency and weaker external legal environment. The results indicate that MLS as an internal monitoring mechanism to some extent plays an alternative role with external governance. In addition, MLS can improve the long-term value of the company by improving CSR performance.

Key words: Multiple Large Shareholders (MLS), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Information Transparency, Legal Environment, Firm Value

中图分类号:

F272.3

冯晓晴, 文雯, 靳毓. 多个大股东与企业社会责任[J]. 财经论丛, 2020, 36(10): 64-74.

FENG Xiaoqing, WEN Wen, JIN Yu. Multiple Large Shareholders and Corporate Social Responsibility[J]. , 2020, 36(10): 64-74.

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