产业政策与上市公司并购重组溢价——基于并购重组委行政审核的经验证据

财经论丛 ›› 2021, Vol. 37 ›› Issue (4): 61-71.

产业政策与上市公司并购重组溢价——基于并购重组委行政审核的经验证据

袁业虎¹, 汤晟², 管考磊¹

1.江西财经大学会计学院,江西南昌 330013;
2.暨南大学管理学院,广东广州 510632

收稿日期:2020-07-01 出版日期:2021-04-10 发布日期:2021-04-13
作者简介:袁业虎(1968-),男,江西靖安人,江西财经大学会计学院教授;汤晟(1996-),男,江西宜春人,暨南大学管理学院博士生;管考磊(1984-),男,山东郓城人,江西财经大学会计学院副教授,博士。
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金项目(71962010);国家自然科学基金项目(71862015)

Industrial Policy and M&A Premium of China Listed Companies——Based on the Empirical Evidence of Administrative Verification of M&A Committee

YUAN Yehu¹, TANG Sheng², GUAN Kaolei¹

1. School of Accouting, Jiangxi University of Finance and Economics, Nanchang 330013, China;
2. School of Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China

Received:2020-07-01 Online:2021-04-10 Published:2021-04-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于并购方视角的议价理论和被并购方视角的隐性获利理论,本文以我国2008~2018年并购重组委审核通过的中国沪深两市A股上市公司并购重组事项为样本,研究了产业政策对上市公司并购重组溢价的影响。研究发现,受产业政策支持的上市公司为并购重组事项支付了更低的并购溢价。进一步研究发现,当上市公司属于民营企业、所处市场化程度较高的地区时,受产业政策支持的上市公司为并购重组事项所支付的并购溢价水平也更低;另外,并购重组实现后,受产业政策支持的民企上市公司展现出了更高的股票回报率,隐性获利由此得以真正实现。本文的研究结论为上市公司和监管部门提供了重要的管理和政策启示。

关键词: 议价能力理论, 隐性获利理论, 并购重组, 产业政策

Abstract: Based on the bargaining theory from the perspective of the acquirer and hidden earnouts theory from the perspective of the acquired party, this paper examines the impact of industrial policies on the M&A premium of listed companies based on the M&A cases of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets approved by the M&A committee from 2008 to 2018. The results are as follows: First, Listed companies supported by industrial policies have paid a lower M&A premium for M&A; Second, when listed companies are private enterprises, or are located in regions with a higher degree of marketization, those supported by industrial policies have paid a lower level of M&A premium for M&A. Moreover, those listed private enterprises supported by industrial policies have better performance and produce a higher rate of stock returns after the realization of M&A, and the target companies do realize the hidden earnouts brought by M&A. The conclusions of this paper provide important management and policy implications for listed companies and regulators.

Key words: Bargaining Theory, Hidden Earnouts Theory, M&A, Industrial Policy

中图分类号:

F420

袁业虎, 汤晟, 管考磊. 产业政策与上市公司并购重组溢价——基于并购重组委行政审核的经验证据[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(4): 61-71.

YUAN Yehu, TANG Sheng, GUAN Kaolei. Industrial Policy and M&A Premium of China Listed Companies——Based on the Empirical Evidence of Administrative Verification of M&A Committee[J]. , 2021, 37(4): 61-71.

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