金融监管对中国实体经济增长的影响研究

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

基于2009~2018年中国内地31个省份的面板数据,检验了金融监管对中国实体经济增长的影响和内在机制。研究结果表明:金融监管强度和中国实体经济增长之间存在“倒U型”关系,但目前的金融监管强度还未达到“最优水平”,从而在总体上促进了中国实体经济增长。此外,金融监管应保持与金融效率的适配性。金融监管强度影响中国实体经济增长主要是通过金融风险抑制效应与融资规模收缩效应发挥作用,并且金融风险抑制效应大于融资规模收缩效应。

关键词: 金融监管, 实体经济, 金融风险, 融资

Abstract:

Since the implementation of the reform and opening-up policy, China’s financial development has made considerable progress, which has effectively promoted the growth of the real economy. However, it can not be ignored that while the financial development has made considerable progress, a series of financial problems has followed, such as the idling of funds in the financial system, the hidden debt of local governments, the high leverage ratio of the residential sector, the gradual “externalization”of the loan business of commercial banks, and the concentration of risks in the financial system, which has seriously affected China’s financial and economic security. For this reason, since 2016, the prevention and resolution of financial risks has risen to the height of national strategy and national security. As an important means of preventing financial risks and maintaining financial stability, financial supervision has been highly valued by the party and the country.

Under the framework of general equilibrium, this paper incorporates financial supervision into Romer’s endogenous growth model, and analyzes the effect of the financial supervision on the growth of the real economy and its influence mechanism. The dynamic panel model is used to test the effect of the financial supervision on the growth of China’s real economy and the intermediary effect model is applied to test the internal mechanism of the financial risk suppression effect and the financing scale change effect. Besides, a robustness test is carried out from the following three aspects: the index substitution, the instrumental variable method and the simultaneous equations model. The research results show that there is an “inverted U-shaped” relationship between the intensity of the financial supervision and the growth of China’s real economy. When its value is below 6.10%, the financial supervision is beneficial to China’s economic growth. When its value is above 6.10%, the financial supervision will restrain China’s economic growth. During the sample period, the ratio of financial supervision expenditures of various provinces in China to the added value of the financial industry is only 0.0118, which is far less than the critical value of the “inverted U-shaped” relationship between the intensity of the financial supervision and the growth of China’s real economy. The intensity of the financial supervision has not yet reached the “optimal level”, which has generally promoted China’s economic growth. In addition, the financial supervision should maintain “fitness”with the financial efficiency. Furthermore, this article also finds that the impact of the intensity of the financial supervision on China’s real economic growth is mainly exerted through the financial risk suppression effect and the financing scale shrinkage effect, and the financial risk suppression effect is greater than the financing scale shrinkage effect.

The research contributions of this paper are as follows: First, a theoretical modelis constructed from the dual perspectives of the financial risk suppression and the financing effects to elaborate on the mechanism and effects of the financial supervision on the growth of China’s real economy; Second, considering the differences in the financial efficiency in various regions, this paper studies the moderating role of the financial efficiency in the impact of the financial supervision on the growth of China’s real economy, thus proving that the financial supervision should maintain “fitness” with the financial efficiency; Third, based on the panel data of 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions in China from 2009 to 2018, it tests the impact of the financial supervision on the growth of China’s real economy, the internal mechanism, and the regulatory role of the financial efficiency in it, and on this basis, policy recommendations are offered to improve the strength of China’s financial supervision and strengthen the role of finance in supporting the real economy. The research in this article not only helps to reveal the connection between the financial industry and China’s real economy growth from the perspective of the financial supervision, but also provides a useful theoretical basis for China to improve the effectiveness of the financial supervision and enhance the ability of financial services to serve the real economy.

Key words: Financial Regulation, Real Economy, Financial Risk, Financing

中图分类号:

F832.1

王博峰. 金融监管对中国实体经济增长的影响研究[J]. 财经论丛, 2021, 37(8): 47-58.

WANG Bofeng. Effects of Financial Regulation on China’s Real Economic Growth[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2021, 37(8): 47-58.

图/表 7

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变量	样本量	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
Growth	310	0.1062	0.0686	-0.1740	0.2839
γ	310	0.0118	0.0173	0.0001	0.1407
K	310	0.1768	0.0507	0.0655	0.4454
L	310	0.0761	0.0830	-0.3073	0.4912
T	310	0.2364	0.2281	-0.4429	1.8761
open	310	0.2746	0.3213	0.0167	1.5482
fdi	310	0.3481	0.3867	0.0482	1.7289
G	310	0.2734	0.2060	0.0964	1.3792

变量	样本量	均值	标准差	最小值	最大值
Growth	310	0.1062	0.0686	-0.1740	0.2839
γ	310	0.0118	0.0173	0.0001	0.1407
K	310	0.1768	0.0507	0.0655	0.4454
L	310	0.0761	0.0830	-0.3073	0.4912
T	310	0.2364	0.2281	-0.4429	1.8761
open	310	0.2746	0.3213	0.0167	1.5482
fdi	310	0.3481	0.3867	0.0482	1.7289
G	310	0.2734	0.2060	0.0964	1.3792

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
变量	FE	FE	IV-GMM	Sys-GMM
γ	0.9964^**(0.4662)	0.9159^**(0.4230)	0.9163^**(0.4233)	0.9129^**(0.4257)
γ²	-8.0904^*(4.3219)	-7.7882^**(3.2172)	-7.5593^**(3.1244)	-7.4781^**(3.1194)
K		0.8222^***(0.0621)	0.8168^***(0.0624)	0.6434^***(0.0512)
L		0.0312(0.0416)	0.0432(0.0416)	0.0556(0.0323)
T		0.4443^***(0.0842)	0.4465^***(0.0867)	0.2727^***(0.0713)
open		-0.0421(0.0312)	0.0543(0.0453)	0.1009^***(0.0215)
fdi		0.4817(0.3124)	-0.0986(0.2321)	-0.2932(0.3121)
G		-0.1421^**(0.0646)	-0.0343(0.0321)	-0.1215^***(0.0246)
L.Growth				0.2548^***(0.0215)
cons	0.2048^***(0.0321)	0.3445^***(0.0303)	0.1568^***(0.0112)	0.3035^***(0.0354)
N	310	310	279	279
AR²	0.0721	0.2765	0.0321
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic			98.454
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic			924.908
Hansen J statistic			13.567
AR(1) p-value				0.0002
AR(2) p-value				0.6898
Sargan p-value				1.0000

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
变量	FE	FE	IV-GMM	Sys-GMM
γ	0.9964^**(0.4662)	0.9159^**(0.4230)	0.9163^**(0.4233)	0.9129^**(0.4257)
γ²	-8.0904^*(4.3219)	-7.7882^**(3.2172)	-7.5593^**(3.1244)	-7.4781^**(3.1194)
K		0.8222^***(0.0621)	0.8168^***(0.0624)	0.6434^***(0.0512)
L		0.0312(0.0416)	0.0432(0.0416)	0.0556(0.0323)
T		0.4443^***(0.0842)	0.4465^***(0.0867)	0.2727^***(0.0713)
open		-0.0421(0.0312)	0.0543(0.0453)	0.1009^***(0.0215)
fdi		0.4817(0.3124)	-0.0986(0.2321)	-0.2932(0.3121)
G		-0.1421^**(0.0646)	-0.0343(0.0321)	-0.1215^***(0.0246)
L.Growth				0.2548^***(0.0215)
cons	0.2048^***(0.0321)	0.3445^***(0.0303)	0.1568^***(0.0112)	0.3035^***(0.0354)
N	310	310	279	279
AR²	0.0721	0.2765	0.0321
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic			98.454
Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic			924.908
Hansen J statistic			13.567
AR(1) p-value				0.0002
AR(2) p-value				0.6898
Sargan p-value				1.0000

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
变量	实体经济增长	融资规模	实体经济增长	金融风险	实体经济增长
γ	0.6506^*(0.3335)	-0.0339^**(0.0150)	0.2324^*(0.1273)	-0.9262^*(0.4440)	1.0870^***(0.4141)
FD			0.1060^*(0.0540)
Risk					-0.0298^**(0.0137)
L.Growth	0.4495^***(0.0286)		0.4083^***(0.0302)		0.4983^***(0.0602)
L.FD		0.6940^***(0.0346)
L.Risk				0.6714^***(0.0363)
cons	0.0998^***(0.0059)	0.2675^***(0.0072)	0.0465^***(0.0151)	0.3356^***(0.0135)	0.1044^***(0.0121)
AR(1) p-value	0.0002	0.0003	0.0005	0.0004	0.0002
AR(2) p-value	0.4913	0.6913	0.8032	0.5769	0.6546
Sargan p-value	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000	1.0000
N	279	279	279	279	279