关键词: 公司战略, 高管薪酬, 薪酬业绩敏感性

Abstract:

Based on the data of A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2016, this paper studies the impact of the corporate strategy on the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts. It is found that there is a significant negative correlation between the corporate strategy and the compensation performance sensitivity. The more aggressive the corporate strategy is, the lower the sensitivity of the compensation performance. The conclusion is still valid with the robustness test. Further analysis finds that agency problems and the information quality can significantly affect the relationship between the corporate strategy and the compensation performance sensitivity. That is, the significant negative effect only exists in the group with lower-level corporate governance and poor information quality. Moreover, we find that the more aggressive the corporal strategy is, the more likely the top managers are to receive excess compensation. In summary, this study concludes that the aggressive corporate strategy would facilitate management’s self-interest (obtaining unreasonable compensation), thus reducing the effectiveness of executive compensation contracts.

Key words: Corporate Strategy, Manager Compensation, Compensation Performance Sensitivity