关键词: 非控股股东网络权力, 嵌入效应, 治理效应, 企业风险承担

Abstract:

Based on the theory of network embedding, the agency theory and other theoretical frameworks of interdisciplinary integration, this paper initially constructs the theoretical framework of the impact of the non-controlling shareholders' network on the corporate risk-taking level, and then uses the power quantitative index centrality in social network analysis to measure the network position of the non-controlling shareholders in the whole listed company. Based on the sample of the A-share listed companies during the period of 2014~2018, this paper constructs the non-controlling shareholders' network through the property right relationship built on the common ownership as a form of stable social connection, and discusses the logical relationship between the non-controlling shareholders' network power, an important external governance mechanism, and the firm risk-taking. The shareholders' network is defined as the property right relationship formed by holding shares in the same listed company, and the non-controlling shareholders' network is built on the direct or indirect association after excluding the controlling shareholders in the network, and the network power is the quantitative analysis of the information and the resource endowment of the non-controlling shareholders' network position.
It is found that the non-controlling shareholders' network power can significantly improve the corporate risk-taking. The influence mechanism shows that the network power enhances the level of risk-taking through the embedding effect and the governance effect, the former realizing the added value of the social relationship network through the embedding effect of information and resources, while the latter optimizing the corporate governance effect by the governance effect of controlling shareholders and management agency conflicts. That is, when firms are faced with weak supervision, the non-controlling shareholders' network power plays a stronger role in promoting the level of risk-taking, which makes up for the lack of the internal governance. Further analysis shows that the impact of the network power on corporate risk-taking is specifically manifested in the improvement of the financing level and the investment efficiency, and the acceleration of the R&D investment.
This paper not only enriches the relevant literature on the economic impact of the non-controlling shareholders' network, but also extends the agency theory from the firm level to the network level to explore the governance behavior of non-controlling shareholders. The empirical research on the common ownership behavior of non-controlling shareholders has just started, and the research conclusions are not consistent, and this study is a useful attempt in the area of non-controlling shareholders' governance behavior. Moreover, it expands the research perspective of corporate risk-taking. Historical literature mainly includes the influence of the macro-economy, executive characteristics and the institutional change. To study the influence of the non-controlling shareholder network on risk-taking is helpful for all parties in the market to better understand the risk decision-making behavior. In addition, different from the previous static indicators related to the ownership structure, the research design of this paper uses the social network analysis method to construct the non-controlling shareholders' network. Both the data sorting and the measurement indicators shield the “noise” existing in the previous indicators, and the relationship between the non-controlling shareholders' network power and the risk-taking is discussed more accurately and deeply.

Key words: Non-controlling Shareholders' network Power, Embedding Effect, Governance Effect, Corporate Risk-taking