关键词: 政府监管, 竞争, 博弈, 囚徒困境, 优化路径

Abstract:

The management of the ride-hailing market lags behind the market development. The problems are manifested in the government regulation and the intervention in the market behavior. The purpose of this paper is to improve the coupling between the theory and the practice. This paper builds different game models to study the path which can promote the development of the ride-hailing market. The“thief guard” game model is used to explain the reasons why the government regulation intensity and the regulation effect are repeated. The incentive paradox is applied to explain the logic that in the long term, increasing penalties for ride-hailing companies can ease the lack of the regulatory resources and greater punishment on government regulators can reduce ride-hailing companies' illegal behavior. Influencing factors are introduced as independent variables to extend the “thief guard” game model, revealing that effective regulation should focus on such influencing factors as the intensity of the punishment and the amount of the regulation resources. Moreover, based on the Bertrand model and the Cournot model, this paper constructs repeated games with uncertain ending time to analyze the competition strategy of the two stages of the ride-hailing market. It is suggested that measures be taken to stabilize the “prisoner's dilemma” situation, that is, increase the temptation of non-cooperation, reduce the discount rate, increase the number of market players, and give full play to the “maximization and minimization strategy”.

Key words: Government Regulation, Competition, Game, The Prisoner's Dilemma, Optimal Path