国企改革抑制僵尸企业的形成吗——以外部监管为例

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

本文基于企业微观数据,以2003年国资委成立作为准自然实验,使用倍差法考察国资委成立带来的外部监管增强对僵尸企业形成的影响。研究结果发现,外部监管显著抑制了僵尸企业的形成,且这一结论通过多种稳健性检验。进一步的机制检验结果显示,外部监管通过提高企业资产收益率、生产效率、创新能力和实际利息支付抑制了僵尸企业的形成;从动态视角看,外部监管通过抑制新僵尸企业的形成、促进现有僵尸企业的退出和复活减少了国有僵尸企业;外部监管通过提高国企改制成效进一步抑制了僵尸企业的形成。外部监管对低竞争程度行业、上游行业和东中部地区国有企业僵尸化的抑制作用更大。外部监管通过抑制僵尸企业的形成改善了企业间的资源再配置效应,从而提高了行业资源配置效率。本文的研究结论对如何通过非市场方式处置国有僵尸企业具有一定的启示,政府应继续加强对国有企业的外部监管,搞活国有经济,促进国有僵尸企业的出清。

关键词: 国企改革, 外部监管, 僵尸企业, 资源配置

Abstract:

Based on the firm-level micro-data, this paper takes the establishment of the SASAC in 2003 as a quasi-natural experiment, and uses the difference-in- difference method to investigate the impact of external regulation on the formation of zombie firms. The study finds that: (1)External regulation significantly inhibits the formation of zombie firms, and this conclusion passes a variety of robustness tests. (2)The mechanism inspection finds that: firstly, external regulation inhibits the formation of zombies by improving the return on assets, production efficiency, innovation ability and interest payment of firms; secondly, from a dynamic perspective, external regulation reduces zombie firms by inhibiting the formation of new zombies and promoting the exit and resurgence of existing zombies; finally, external regulation further suppresses the formation of zombie firms by acting on the SOE restructuring. (3)The impact of external regulation on the formation of zombie varies by industry and region. Specifically, external regulation has a greater inhibitory effect on the zombies in low-competition industries, upstream industries, and in the central and eastern regions of China. (4)External regulation improves the resource reallocation between firms by inhibiting the formation of zombie firms, thereby improving the efficiency of industry resource allocation. The conclusions of this article have some enlightenment on how to dispose of state-owned zombies through non-market methods. The government should continue to strengthen external regulation of state-owned firms, invigorate the state-owned economy, and promote the clearing of state-owned zombies.

Key words: SOE Reformation, External Regulation, Zombie Firms, Resource Allocation

中图分类号:

F421.1

张俊美, 许家云. 国企改革抑制僵尸企业的形成吗——以外部监管为例[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(3): 102-112.

ZHANG Junmei, XU Jiayun. Does SOE Reformation Inhibit the Formation of Zombie Firms: Take External Regulation as an Example[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(3): 102-112.

图/表 7

参考文献 32

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变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat_i×T_t	-0.025^***(0.005)	-0.030^***(0.005)	-0.014^**(0.006)	-0.017^***(0.005)
tfp_it		-0.023^***(0.002)		-0.020^***(0.002)
size_it		-0.042^***(0.003)		-0.050^***(0.003)
age_it			0.056^***(0.004)	0.062^***(0.004)
kl_it		-0.004^**(0.002)		-0.003(0.002)
debt_it			0.117^***(0.010)	0.093^***(0.010)
export_it			0.007(0.004)	-0.003(0.004)
profit_it		-0.274^***(0.027)		-0.255^***(0.026)
常数项	0.280^***(0.001)	0.639^***(0.020)	0.079^***(0.011)	0.485^***(0.021)
企业固定效应	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
年份固定效应	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R²	0.531	0.539	0.534	0.542

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Treat_i×T_t	-0.025^***(0.005)	-0.030^***(0.005)	-0.014^**(0.006)	-0.017^***(0.005)
tfp_it		-0.023^***(0.002)		-0.020^***(0.002)
size_it		-0.042^***(0.003)		-0.050^***(0.003)
age_it			0.056^***(0.004)	0.062^***(0.004)
kl_it		-0.004^**(0.002)		-0.003(0.002)
debt_it			0.117^***(0.010)	0.093^***(0.010)
export_it			0.007(0.004)	-0.003(0.004)
profit_it		-0.274^***(0.027)		-0.255^***(0.026)
常数项	0.280^***(0.001)	0.639^***(0.020)	0.079^***(0.011)	0.485^***(0.021)
企业固定效应	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
年份固定效应	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R²	0.531	0.539	0.534	0.542

变量	企业间效应			进入效应					退出效应
变量	(1)外部监管实施之前	(2)外部监管实施之后		(3)外部监管实施之前		(4)外部监管实施之后			(5)外部监管实施之前		(6)外部监管实施之后
js_jt	-0.015^***(0.004)	-0.009(0.005)	0.002(0.002)		-0.003(0.002)		0.003(0.002)			0.002(0.003)

变量	企业间效应			进入效应					退出效应
变量	(1)外部监管实施之前	(2)外部监管实施之后		(3)外部监管实施之前		(4)外部监管实施之后			(5)外部监管实施之前		(6)外部监管实施之后
js_jt	-0.015^***(0.004)	-0.009(0.005)	0.002(0.002)		-0.003(0.002)		0.003(0.002)			0.002(0.003)