企业所得税优惠对建立企业年金的影响实证分析——基于上市公司企业所得税实际税负压力的视角

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

为提高企业的年金参与率、促进我国全方位多支柱养老保障体系的构建,本文选取沪深2016—2019年A股上市公司为样本,研究企业所得税优惠对企业建立年金制度的影响。本文发现:企业所得税优惠对建立年金制度的影响呈现倒U型,企业融资成本可以有效调节企业所得税优惠与建立企业年金之间的非线性关系。国有性质、制造行业以及中部地区的企业建立年金受企业所得税优惠的激励作用更明显。为更好发挥企业所得税优惠对建立企业年金的促进作用,本文建议改进激励年金建立的企业所得税优惠方式,并针对企业特征区别制定促进年金发展的企业所得税优惠政策。

关键词: 企业所得税, 企业年金, 税收优惠, 实际所得税税率

Abstract:

Increasing the annuity participation rate of enterprises is conducive to the construction of an all-round multi-pillar pension security system in China. This paper selects A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2016 to 2019 as samples to study the impact of the corporate income tax preference on the establishment of the annuity system. The results show that the impact of the corporate income tax preference on the establishment of the annuity system is inverted U-shaped, and the enterprise financing cost effectively regulates the nonlinear relationship between the corporate income tax preference and the establishment of the enterprise annuity system. The incentive effect of the corporate income tax preference is more obvious for state-owned enterprises, manufacturing industries and enterprises in the east region to establish the annuity system. In order to give full play to the promotion effect of the corporate income tax preference on the construction of enterprises’ annuity system, this paper suggests that the corporate income tax preference methods be improved to promote the establishment of enterprise annuity, and the preferential policies for the corporate income tax be formulated according to the characteristics of different enterprises.

Key words: The Effective Income Tax, Enterprise Annuity, TaxPreference, Effective Income Tax Rate

中图分类号:

F812.42

董一欣, 蓝相洁. 企业所得税优惠对建立企业年金的影响实证分析——基于上市公司企业所得税实际税负压力的视角[J]. 财经论丛, 2022, 38(3): 26-36.

DONG Yixin, LAN Xiangjie. An Empirical Study on the Effect of Enterprise Income Tax Preference on the Establishment of Enterprise Annunity: From the Perspective of Listed Companies’ Actual Corporate Income Tax Burden[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2022, 38(3): 26-36.

图/表 7

参考文献 22

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变量	变量名	样本量	均值	标准差
被解释变量	pension	10,855	0.915	2.153
解释变量	tax	10,855	0.021	0.021
解释变量	tax²	10,855	0.0009	0.002
调节变量	cost	10,855	0.0143	0.041
控制变量	scale	10,855	22.32	1.347
	LEV	10,855	0.405	0.195
	Tobin q	10,855	1.922	1.226
	state	10,855	0.327	0.469
	dual	10,855	0.292	0.455
	growth	10,317	0.215	0.417

变量	变量名	样本量	均值	标准差
被解释变量	pension	10,855	0.915	2.153
解释变量	tax	10,855	0.021	0.021
解释变量	tax²	10,855	0.0009	0.002
调节变量	cost	10,855	0.0143	0.041
控制变量	scale	10,855	22.32	1.347
	LEV	10,855	0.405	0.195
	Tobin q	10,855	1.922	1.226
	state	10,855	0.327	0.469
	dual	10,855	0.292	0.455
	growth	10,317	0.215	0.417

变量	(1)POLS	(2)POLS	(3)FE	(4)FE
变量	企业年金密度	企业年金密度	企业年金密度	企业年金密度
tax	12.980^***	12.907^***	8.367^***
	(2.284)	(2.287)	(2.359)
tax²	-95.155^***	-94.585^***	-79.315^***
	(24.633)	(24.659)	(24.762)
L.tax				6.775^**
				(2.843)
L.tax²				-69.483^**
				(29.675)
scale	0.297^***	0.298^***	0.275^***	0.276^***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
LEV	-0.550^***	-0.551^***	-0.740^***	-0.835^***
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.158)
Tobin q	0.017	0.016	0.036^**	0.045^**
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)
state	1.986^***	1.985^***	1.846^***	1.891^***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.053)
dual	-0.108^**	-0.108^**	-0.088^**	-0.074
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.050)
growth	-0.038	-0.040	-0.030	0.005
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.063)
时间效应	否	控制	控制	控制
行业效应	否	否	控制	控制
Constant	-6.326^***	-6.316^***	-5.659^***	-5.679^***
	(0.397)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(0.464)
Observations	10,317	10,317	10,317	7,331
R-squared	0.266	0.266	0.290	0.302

变量	(1)POLS	(2)POLS	(3)FE	(4)FE
变量	企业年金密度	企业年金密度	企业年金密度	企业年金密度
tax	12.980^***	12.907^***	8.367^***
	(2.284)	(2.287)	(2.359)
tax²	-95.155^***	-94.585^***	-79.315^***
	(24.633)	(24.659)	(24.762)
L.tax				6.775^**
				(2.843)
L.tax²				-69.483^**
				(29.675)
scale	0.297^***	0.298^***	0.275^***	0.276^***
	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.022)
LEV	-0.550^***	-0.551^***	-0.740^***	-0.835^***
	(0.121)	(0.121)	(0.128)	(0.158)
Tobin q	0.017	0.016	0.036^**	0.045^**
	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.017)	(0.023)
state	1.986^***	1.985^***	1.846^***	1.891^***
	(0.044)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.053)
dual	-0.108^**	-0.108^**	-0.088^**	-0.074
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.050)
growth	-0.038	-0.040	-0.030	0.005
	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.063)
时间效应	否	控制	控制	控制
行业效应	否	否	控制	控制
Constant	-6.326^***	-6.316^***	-5.659^***	-5.679^***
	(0.397)	(0.404)	(0.404)	(0.464)
Observations	10,317	10,317	10,317	7,331
R-squared	0.266	0.266	0.290	0.302

变量	lnpension
tax	10.63^**
	(4.824)
tax²	-111.9^**
	(56.09)
控制变量	控制
时间效应	控制
行业效应	控制
Constant	-6.175^***
	(0.555)
Observations	7,331
R-squared	0.302