柔性监管制度与上市公司创新意愿——基于交易所研发问询的视角

财经论丛 ›› 2023, Vol. 39 ›› Issue (6): 47-57.

柔性监管制度与上市公司创新意愿——基于交易所研发问询的视角

齐荻¹, 许文瀚²

1.南京农业大学金融学院,江苏南京 210095;
2.南京审计大学会计学院,江苏南京 211815

收稿日期:2021-08-30 出版日期:2023-06-10 发布日期:2023-06-13
作者简介:齐荻(1991—),女,江西上饶人,南京农业大学金融学院讲师,博士;许文瀚(1988—),男,浙江宁波人,南京审计大学会计学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金青年项目(19CJY008);南京农业大学中央高校基本科研业务费人文社会科学研究基金项目(SKYC2022004);南京农业大学金融学院青年基金项目(804022)

Flexible Regulatory System and Innovation Willingness of Listed Companies: Based on the Perspective of R&D Inquiry

QI Di¹, XU Wenhan²

1. College of Finance, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing 210095, China;
2. School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China

Received:2021-08-30 Online:2023-06-10 Published:2023-06-13

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 问询函是证劵交易所对上市公司的一种柔性监管制度,主要针对公司业绩异常、经营风险和信息披露提出问询,要求公司在限定日期之内回复。不同于过去的实质性处罚措施,问询函给予了公司解释与改正的时间和空间,因此对公司创新意愿的影响也会有所区别。本文基于交易所提出的研发问询,实证检验研发问询对上市公司创新意愿产生的影响,研究发现,研发问询对公司创新意愿有提升效应。需要会计师回复的问询函能够放大这种效应,而需要律师回复的问询函却削弱了这种效应。敏感性分析发现,在国有、高科技型和不存在研发操纵现象的公司,这种效应更明显。

关键词: 问询函, 柔性监管, 研发问询, 创新意愿

Abstract: An inquiry letter is a flexible regulatory system forlisted companieson the stock exchange, mainly asking questions about abnormal performances, operational risks and information disclosure, and requiring companies to respond within a limited period of time. Unlike past substantial penalties, inquiry lettersgivecompanies time and space to explain and correct, and therefore have a different impact on companies' willingness to innovate. Based on the R&D inquiries proposed by the stock exchange, this paper empirically tests the impact of the R&D inquiries on companies' willingness to innovate. It is found that the R&D inquiries have an enhancing effect on companies' willingness to innovate. This effect is amplified by letters of inquiry that require an accountant's response, while it is weakened by letters of inquiry that require a lawyer's response. Sensitivity analysis found that state-owned enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and enterprises with lower levels of R&D manipulation have a more sensitive response to inquiry letters and their response needs.

Key words: Inquiry Letter, Flexible Supervision, R&D Inquiry, Innovation Willingness

中图分类号:

F831.4

齐荻, 许文瀚. 柔性监管制度与上市公司创新意愿——基于交易所研发问询的视角[J]. 财经论丛, 2023, 39(6): 47-57.

QI Di, XU Wenhan. Flexible Regulatory System and Innovation Willingness of Listed Companies: Based on the Perspective of R&D Inquiry[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2023, 39(6): 47-57.

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