关键词: 多个大股东, 企业违规, 信息监督, 协同治理

Abstract: This paper takes Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as samples to examine the economic effects of multiple large shareholders in corporate violations. It is found that multiple large shareholders effectively inhibit corporate violations, which is reflected in the supervisory governance effect of multiple large shareholders. Mechanism and path analysis shows that the influence mechanism of multiple large shareholders to curb corporate fraud is information supervision and collaborative governance, and the specific path is achieved by appointing directors and issuing withdrawal threats. Heterogeneity analysis finds that the higher the degree of supervisory governance and the more stable the shareholding of multiple large shareholders, the stronger the inhibitory effect on corporate fraud; Multiple large shareholders can reduce information disclosure fraud and operation fraud, and also have an important inhibitory effect on violation tendency, but the effect on violation auditing is not significant. In addition, multiple large shareholders also enhance the market value and long-term financial performance of firms by suppressing corporate violations and reduce future business risks. Therefore, both regulatory authorities and listed companies should pay attention to the governance role of multiple large shareholders, and create a good internal and external environment for multiple large shareholders to exert their supervisory governance effect, thereby reducing corporate fraud and promoting high-quality corporate development.

Key words: Multiple Large Shareholders, Corporate Fraud, Information Supervision, Collaborative Governance