行权业绩考核、企业生命周期与股权激励效应

财经论丛 ›› 2024, Vol. 40 ›› Issue (3): 69-79.

行权业绩考核、企业生命周期与股权激励效应

陈文强¹, 周荣真², 毛孝南¹, 王晓婷³

1.浙江财经大学会计学院,浙江杭州 310018;
2.浙江财经大学经济学院,浙江杭州 310018;
3.浙江工商大学工商管理学院,浙江杭州 310018

收稿日期:2023-02-15 出版日期:2024-03-10 发布日期:2024-03-11
通讯作者: 毛孝南(1999—),男,江西上饶人,浙江财经大学会计学院硕士生。
作者简介:陈文强(1989—),男,云南曲靖人,浙江财经大学会计学院副教授;周荣真(1995—),女,河南周口人,浙江财经大学经济学院博士生;王晓婷(1982—),女,江苏连云港人,浙江工商大学工商管理学院副教授。
基金资助:
浙江省哲学社会科学青年重点项目(24NDQN09Z);国家自然科学青年基金项目(72002190);浙江省自然科学基金一般项目(LY24G020003);浙江省哲学社会科学规划之江青年专项课题(24ZJQN082Y)

Vesting Performance Hurdle, Corporate Life Cycle and the Effect of Equity Incentive

CHEN Wenqiang¹ , ZHOU Rongzhen², MAO Xiaonan¹, WANG Xiaoting³

1. School of Accounting, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China;
2. School of Economics, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China;
3. School of Business Administration, Zhejiang Gongshang University, Hangzhou 310018, China

Received:2023-02-15 Online:2024-03-10 Published:2024-03-11

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 科学的业绩考核是有效激励的前提,既可能通过利益协同机制强化激励效应(利益协同假说),也可能通过降低风险承担而造成激励扭曲(风险规避假说)。本文基于企业生命周期的动态视角,考察了股权激励的行权业绩考核在企业不同发展阶段的异质性影响效应和作用机制。研究发现:行权业绩考核总体上有利于强化股权激励效应,支持了“利益协同假说”;分发展阶段看,行权业绩考核的作用效果具有生命周期异质性。其中,成长期企业更适宜设置适中的业绩目标,成熟期企业更适宜设置严格的业绩目标,衰退期企业更适宜设置宽松的业绩目标。进一步研究发现,行权业绩考核可通过利益协同和风险承担两条潜在渠道发挥作用,但具体机制因企业所处发展阶段的不同而存在明显差异。

关键词: 股权激励, 行权业绩考核, 企业生命周期, 利益协同, 风险承担

Abstract: Scientific performance hurdle is the premise of effective incentive, which can either enhance the incentive effect by strengthening benefit synergy (benefit synergy hypothesis) or cause incentive distortion by reducing risk taking (risk avoidance hypothesis). Based on the dynamic perspective of corporate life cycle, this paper investigates the heterogeneous effect and mechanism of vesting performance hurdle of equity incentive in different development stages of enterprises. The results show that vesting performance hurdles are conducive to strengthening firms' future performance, which supports the benefit synergy hypothesis. The effects of vesting performance hurdles manifest significant life cycle heterogeneity. For enterprises in the growing stage, moderate performance hurdles can better improve performance. For mature enterprises, stringent performance hurdles can promote future performance more significantly. For enterprises in the declining stage, lax performance hurdles are more effective for performance enhancement. Further study finds that stringent performance hurdles promote the performance of companies in the growing stage mainly through the benefit synergy effect, while lax performance hurdles drive the performance of companies in the declining stage mainly through the risk-taking effect. For growing firms, moderate performance hurdles enhance future performance through both the benefit synergy effect and the risk-taking effect.

Key words: Equity Incentive, Vesting Performance Hurdle, Corporate Life Cycle, Benefit Synergy, Risk Taking Effect

中图分类号:

F271.5

陈文强, 周荣真, 毛孝南, 王晓婷. 行权业绩考核、企业生命周期与股权激励效应[J]. 财经论丛, 2024, 40(3): 69-79.

CHEN Wenqiang , ZHOU Rongzhen, MAO Xiaonan, WANG Xiaoting. Vesting Performance Hurdle, Corporate Life Cycle and the Effect of Equity Incentive[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2024, 40(3): 69-79.

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