关键词: 国有资本参股, 反向混改, 独立董事履职, 独立董事异议

Abstract: This paper uses a sample of Chinese A-share private listed firms from 2008 to 2021 to investigate the impact of state-owned capital participation on independent directors' performance of duties in private firms and the underlying mechanism. It is found that state-owned capital participation significantly increases the dissenting statements of independent directors in private listed companies, indicating that non-controlling state-owned shareholders can promote independent directors' performance of duties. The above association is more pronounced when the financial constraints of a firm are severer, the power of the controlling shareholder is less, and the intervention level of the government is lower. The mechanism tests reveal that state-owned shareholders improve independent directors' performance of duties by reducing directors' risk of losing their current board seat and improving firms' information environment. Further examination of the heterogeneous characteristics of state-owned shareholders finds that local or cross-industry state-owned shareholders have a stronger promoting effect on independent directors' performance. Besides, the (over) appointment of directors by state-owned shareholders can strengthen the promotion effect of state-owned capital on independent directors' performance. Finally, the test of economic consequences indicates that state-owned capital participation enhances the monitoring effect and the value-adding effect of independent directors' performance. The conclusion of this paper has positive policy implications for further improving the governance effect of independent directors and deepening the reverse mixed-ownership reform of private firms.

Key words: State-Owned Capital Participation, Reverse Mixed Ownership Reform, Independent Directors' Performance of Duties, Independent Directors' Dissenting