公告直通披露与企业供应链透明度

财经论丛 ›› 2025, Vol. 41 ›› Issue (6): 88-98.

公告直通披露与企业供应链透明度

王禹¹, 曹以伦²

1.南开大学经济学院,天津 300071;
2.内蒙古大学经济管理学院,内蒙古呼和浩特 010021

收稿日期:2024-07-25 出版日期:2025-06-10 发布日期:2025-06-10
作者简介:王禹(1994—),男,天津市人,南开大学经济学院博士生;曹以伦(1993—),男,内蒙古呼和浩特人,内蒙古大学经济管理学院讲师,博士。
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目(21&ZD112)

Direct Disclosure of Announcement and Transparency of Corporate Supply Chain

WANG Yu¹, CAO Yilun²

1. School of Economics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Inner Mongolia University, Hohhot 010021, China

Received:2024-07-25 Online:2025-06-10 Published:2025-06-10

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 2014年,深圳证券交易所全面推行信息披露直通车业务,取消了对企业公告的事前审核转而开展事后监管。本文以直通车业务的开通作为外生冲击,使用深市A股上市公司数据探究了公告直通披露对企业供应链透明度的影响。研究发现,公告直通披露显著降低了企业供应链透明度。机制方面,企业掩盖机会主义行为的机制显著,而商业秘密保护机制则并不显著。异质性分析发现,在再融资风险更高、面临更强的监管处罚震慑以及董秘具有财务经历的企业中,供应链透明度下滑的程度较为微弱。本文的发现表明,监管职能的后移在增强企业自主性的同时会放大其机会主义动机。据此,本文建议加强信息披露监管、优化监管资源配置以及促进企业内外部治理协同。

关键词: 直通披露, 供应链透明度, 信息披露监管, 机会主义行为, 商业秘密

Abstract: The Shenzhen Stock Exchange implemented the direct disclosure reform in 2014, which abolished ex-ante censorship of corporate announcements and replaced it with ex-post supervision. Taking the direct disclosure reform as an exogenous shock, this paper investigates the relationship between direct disclosure of announcements and the transparency of corporate supply chain. We find that after the direct disclosure reform, the transparency of corporate supply chain decreases significantly. The mechanism by which firms conceal opportunistic behavior is significant, while the mechanism to protect trade secrets is not. Heterogeneity analysis found that the decline in supply chain transparency is smaller in companies with higher refinancing risks, or companies with stronger regulatory sanctions, and those with financially-experienced secretaries of the Board. This paper shows that the direct disclosure reform increases the opportunistic motive while giving firms more autonomy. The findings have implications for enhancing disclosure regulation, identifying the focus of disclosure regulation, and promoting coordinated interactions between internal and external governance mechanisms.

Key words: Direct Disclosure Reform, Supply Chain Transparency, Disclosure Supervision, Opportunistic Behavior, Trade Secrets

中图分类号:

F275

王禹, 曹以伦. 公告直通披露与企业供应链透明度[J]. 财经论丛, 2025, 41(6): 88-98.

WANG Yu, CAO Yilun. Direct Disclosure of Announcement and Transparency of Corporate Supply Chain[J]. Collected Essays on Finance and Economics, 2025, 41(6): 88-98.

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