财经论丛 ›› 2014, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (2): 56-63.

• 财务与会计 • 上一篇    下一篇

盈余管理是高管减持的前奏吗?

游春晖1,厉国威2   

  1. 1. 中南财经政法大学会计学院
    2. 中南财经政法大学
  • 收稿日期:2013-07-02 修回日期:2013-10-13 出版日期:2014-02-10 发布日期:2013-12-11
  • 通讯作者: 游春晖
  • 基金资助:

    国家利益导向的中国环境审计体系创新研究

Is Earnings Management the Prelude of Executives Share Reduction?

  • Received:2013-07-02 Revised:2013-10-13 Online:2014-02-10 Published:2013-12-11

摘要: 本文运用2009-2012年间我国A股市场上市公司数据,实证分析高管减持对盈余管理的影响。研究结果表明,上市公司中确实存在以配合高管减持为目的的盈余管理行为,减持事件加大了公司正向盈余管理的概率;高管减持幅度越大,公司正向盈余管理的程度也越强;进一步区分高管与董事长两职合一情况后发现,两职合一的上市公司较两职分离的上市公司,其盈余管理的程度更强。本文的结论有助于理解高管减持对盈余管理的影响,对进一步规范高管减持行为,保护投资者的利益具有一定的借鉴意义。

Abstract: Using listed companies’ data in 2009-2012, this paper discusses the impact of reduction phenomena of executives share on earnings management. The results show that the occurrence of reduction increased the probability of positive earnings management; the larger the reduction of executives share, the stronger the degree of positive earnings management; the company which has the duality of chairman and CEO has stronger positive earnings management. The conclusions above helps to understand the impact of reduction of executives share on earnings management, and it has a certain meaning for regulating the reduction behavior of executives share and protecting the interests of investors.

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