财经论丛 ›› 2014, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (9): 53-59.
• 财务与会计 • 上一篇 下一篇
周雪峰
收稿日期:
修回日期:
出版日期:
发布日期:
通讯作者:
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金项目“高管薪酬契约设计、研发配置优化与公司价值创造”;国家自然科学基金项目“上市公司如何选择并购对价与融资方式?—基于嵌套结构的经验研究”
Received:
Revised:
Online:
Published:
摘要: 基于2003-2012年沪深A股上市公司为研究样本,实证检验商业信用对非效率投资的影响。研究发现:上市公司的过度投资行为主要是由代理冲突比较严重且公司存在大量自由现金流而引发,投资不足主要是由融资约束引发,并非由债权代理冲突引发;上市公司的商业信用能够抑制过度投资,发挥治理作用。同时,商业信用又能够缓解投资不足,发挥融资功能。
Abstract: Based on the cases of A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2012 in Shanghai and Shenzhen, this empirical Study studied the impacts of trade credit on inefficient investment. The major findings in this study include: Overinvestment behavior of listed companies is mainly because that agency conflict is more serious and the companies raise a lot of free cash flow; and underinvestment is primarily due to financing constraints, rather than the agency conflict between shareholders and creditors; Listed companies’ trade credit in general can inhabit overinvestment and give play to the role of governance. Meantime, trade credit can alleviate underinvestment in listed companies and plays a role of financing.
中图分类号:
F230
周雪峰. 商业信用对非效率投资的影响:融资抑或治理?[J]. 财经论丛, 2014, 30(9): 53-59.
0 / / 推荐
导出引用管理器 EndNote|Ris|BibTeX
链接本文: https://cjlc.zufe.edu.cn/CN/
https://cjlc.zufe.edu.cn/CN/Y2014/V30/I9/53