财经论丛 ›› 2015, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (3): 17-23.
• 财政与税务 • 上一篇 下一篇
马蔡琛,张铁玲,孙利媛
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基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目;国家社会科学基金项目;教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目
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摘要: 本文以预算资金使用部门作为考察对象,构建了预算执行偏差的前景理论模型,试图解构不同行为模式下的决策者偏好选择。根据参照依赖、损失厌恶、敏感度递减等特性,刻画了预算执行偏差的行为响应机制。进而提出了利用“可得性偏差”,建立相应的奖惩机制,取消法定支出挂钩的做法,突破“沉锚效应”的路径依赖,突出“框架效应”的正面影响,提升财政资金使用绩效等政策建议。
Abstract: Abstract: This paper takes the user departments of budgetary fund as study objects, constructs the prospect theory model for budget execution bias and analyzes decision-makers preference selections under different patterns of behavior. According to the characteristics such as reference dependence, loss aversion, diminishing sensitivity, this paper depicts the behavior response mechanism of budget execution bias. Then it makes policy suggestions,which includes establishing a reward and punishment mechanism based on availability fallacy, unhooking legal expenditure’s connection with growth rate of financial revenue and expenditure or gross product, breaking path dependence of anchoring, highlighting the positive impacts of framing effect and improving financial fund performance.
中图分类号:
F812.3
马蔡琛 张铁玲 孙利媛. 政府预算执行偏差的行为经济学分析[J]. 财经论丛, 2015, 31(3): 17-23.
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链接本文: https://cjlc.zufe.edu.cn/CN/
https://cjlc.zufe.edu.cn/CN/Y2015/V31/I3/17