Abstract: Abstract: Traditional government competition focuses either taxation competition or public expenditure competition, while this paper pays more attention to China’s unique land preference policy. Based on the panel data of China’s 29 provinces through 2003 to 2009, the paper employs a spatial auto-regressive model to analyze land preference police. It is found that there is a significant competitive effect of land preference policy among nationwide local governments. And the competition among economically neighboring provinces is more furious than that among geographically neighboring ones. However, a significant competitive effect of land preference policy exists only in Western China. Eastern and Central China do not seem to adopt the same competition strategy as Western China does.

摘要： 传统地方政府竞争多以税收竞争和公共支出竞争为研究对象，而本文则关注了我国特有的土地优惠政策竞争。基于我国29省市区2003-2009年间的面板数据，本文运用空间自回归模型对土地优惠政策竞争进行实证分析。研究表明尽管就全国范围看，地方政府已就土地优惠政策展开了积极竞争，并且经济水平相近地区要比地理位置相邻地区竞争效应更为显著。而从分地区来看，观测期内只有西部地区存在显著土地优惠政策的竞争效应，东部和中部地区并没有采取与西部地区一致的土地优惠竞争策略。