Abstract: Based on Chinese listed commercial banks from 2001 to 2010,the study researches the relationship between audit quality and economy interest provided by listed banks with different property right.We find that, relative to non-government controlled listed banks, government controlled listed banks have higher earnings management with providing auditors with more economy interest.Higher economy interest induces auditors to meet clients’ manipulation of earnings management for government controlled banks ,and hence audit quality is impaired,but such evidences have not been found in non-government controlled banks.

摘要： 以2001年至2010年期间的A股上市银行为研究样本，检验不同产权性质的上市银行支付给审计师的经济利益对审计质量的影响。研究发现，上市银行支付给审计师的经济利益越大，与非政府控制的上市银行相比较，政府控制的上市银行的盈余管理水平更高；审计师为非政府控制的上市银行提供业务情形中，审计质量并未随着客户支付的经济利益的增加而降低，在为政府控制的上市银行提供业务情形中，过高的经济利益促使审计师默许客户的盈余管理行为，导致审计质量遭受损害，这在一定程度上说明，并非在所有情况下，审计质量都会随着经济利益的增加而受损。