Abstract: At present rural cooperative banks are troubled by mingled property and ownership absence, which are expected, by the central government, to be solved through reform in rural commercial banks. The paper based on both financial demand of the farmers households and local economic development sets up dynamic game model with complete information and shows that since local official's performance is linked to GDP the results in games between central government and local government decide the latter’s option of property regime. That’s to say the central government wishes the local government to clearly establish property regime in RCC, whereas the local government will choose regime of rural commercial banks according to GDP maximization which makes the reform deviate from intended target and result in many problems. Accordingly, the paper puts forward some relevant policy proposals.

摘要： 目前农村合作银行存在产权不清和所有者缺位问题，中央政府希望通过改制为农村商业银行来解决。本文基于农户金融需求和地方经济发展双重视角建立完全信息动态博弈模型分析表明，在地方政府官员的政绩与GDP挂钩体制下，地方政府与中央政府的博弈结果决定了地方政府的产权制度选择行为，也就是说，中央政府希望地方政府建立产权清晰的农村信用社产权制度，而地方政府按照GDP最大化目标选择的农村合作银行制度使改革偏离了预定目标，导致众多问题出现。据此，提出了相关的政策建议。