Abstract: This paper examines the incentive effects of managerial ownership on operating performance of listed companies before and after the non-tradable share reform which use 1282 listed companies of the balance of panel data 2002-2010 in china and analysis the whether equity division reform is an important system for the improvement of the environment management holding business performance influence. The result finds that before the non-tradable share reform, the financial performance of companies that have implemented managerial ownership incentive is not significantly different from control samples that have not. After the non-tradable share reform, their operating performance is significantly higher than those of control samples. This shows that the improvement of the system environment enhance the influence of management holdings of listed companies to the operating performance.

摘要： 本文使用中国A股1282家上市公司2002-2010年的平衡面板数据，系统分析了股权分置改革这一重要的制度环境的改善对管理层持股经营业绩的影响。我们的研究结果表明，在股权分置改革前，管理层是否持股以及持股比例对上市公司经营业绩的相关性较弱，无论使用总资产收益率指标、权益收益率指标还是销售利润率指标，不过，当把股权分置改革置于模型中，管理层持股对企业经营业绩表现出显著的正相关，且其对财务业绩的敏感性也增强。这表明，制度环境的改善是管理层持股对上市公司经营业绩影响的重要调节因素。