Abstract: Based on the assumption that the more the private benefit of control the higher the possibility that the entrepreneur retains the control when the firm goes public, the paper attempts to investigate the relationship between political connection of private listed company and the family involvement in the board of director. The paper argues that, political connection can increase the pecuniary and non-pecuniary private benefit of control and decrease the possibilities that the controlling shareholder is punished by the regulatory institution and capital market due to the tunneling. As a result, the higher the rank of political connection of the controller of private listed company, the larger the private benefit of control and the more family involvement in board of directors. The empirical result brings about the evidence which supports the above argument. The political connection of private listed company has a positive correlation with the involvement in board of directors by family members, the high the rank of political connection the final controller of private listed company, the high degree the family members involve in board of directors. Keywords: Political connection, private benefit of control, family involvement, private listed company

摘要： 现有文献表明，控制权私人收益越大，企业家在企业上市后越倾向保留企业的控制权。本文认为，政治关联通过影响控制权私人收益而促进民营上市公司的治理家族化：政治关联带来的货币和非货币形式收益增加了控制权私人收益的规模，同时政治关联降低了资本市场和政府监管部门对控股股东通过隧道效应实现控制权私人收益的监督和惩罚；在这种情况下，民营企业家有激励通过家族成员介入上市公司的董事会来体现其控制权进而实现政治关联带来的控制权私人收益。而本文提供的经验证据支持上述论断：民营上市公司实际控制人的政治关联与民营上市公司董事会的家族介入程度正相关，实际控制人政治关联度越高，公司董事会中家族成员的数量越多、比例越高。