Abstract: This paper, based on the agency-theory, analyses the relationship between executive compensation and payout policy. Then , by empirical research on data from China A share 2003-2007 listed firms, we come to the conclusion that: executive wage and share holding has positive impact on corporate cash dividends, especially in non-state owned firms. Chinese firm’s compensation contract can not identify the efficiency of managers. Thus the improvement of executive incentive and payout policy should based on the design of executive compensation contracts.

摘要： 基于委托代理理论分析了上市公司高管报酬对分红的影响机理，进而以2003—2010年沪深A股上市公司为样本，检验了高管报酬与公司分红的关系。研究发现：（1）高管货币薪酬、高管持股对公司分红具有显著正向影响；并且二者对分红的影响具有“替代效应”。进一步的研究还发现，相比于国有企业，这种“报酬-分红”敏感性关系在民营上市公司中更为突出。（2）我国上市公司高管薪酬契约并不能对高管“效率”进行有效识别；高管激励与分红优化，需要从“高管报酬契约设计”这一源头抓起。