›› 2013, Vol. 29 ›› Issue (3): 84-91.
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蔡吉甫
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Abstract: Based on the fundamental Principles of trade credit redistribution, using observations of the Chinese listed firms of Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in 2003-2006, this paper empirically study on the relationship between bank loans and trade credits. The results show that bank loans of state-owned controlling companies are significantly positively correlated with its accounts receivable, which shows that bank formal loans available to state-owned controlling companies don’t converted into outputs completely, some of which are informally transfferred to other enterprises versus trade credits. What’s more, these financial leakage effects are even more significant in less profitable state-owned controlling companies. On the contrary, bank loans of private-owned controlling companies are significantly negatively correlated with its accounts payable, which means that credit discriminations in formal financial system, as well as the failure of laws protection of private property rights during economy transition, force private-owned controlling companies to use more trade credits based on implicit contractual relationship in order to ameliorate financial constraints facing in formal financial markest. Though trade credits can play an important role in promoting growth of private-owned controlling companies, an effective formal financial system is critical for a country economy long-term development.
摘要: 利用商业信用再分配的基本原理,从金融漏损和信贷歧视的视角系统研究了银行借款与商业信用之间的关系。研究结果显示,体制内的国有企业在正规金融市场上获得的银行贷款并未完全转化为产出,其中一部分则是以应收账款的形式发生了漏损。进一步研究发现,上述金融漏损效应在盈利能力低的国有企业表现得更明显。而正规金融市场上的信贷配给和所有制歧视迫使民营企业使用了更多的基于隐性契约关系的商业信用。
CLC Number:
F275
蔡吉甫. 金融漏损、银行歧视与商业信用[J]. 财经论丛, 2013, 29(3): 84-91.
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https://cjlc.zufe.edu.cn/EN/Y2013/V29/I3/84