Abstract: There have been researches discussed the governance effect of financial mechanism like dividend policy, debt leverage to the agency problem of high investment opportunities companies. But few researches focus on the influence of independent audit mechanism to high investment opportunities companies’ agency problems. This article examines the comprehensive influence of high quality audit and investment opportunity to accounting information quality from the perspective of earnings value-relevance. The paper finds with the investment opportunities increase the earnings value-relevance will significantly reduce in the Listed Companies. However if hire high quality auditors, the degree of earnings value relevance’s decline will significantly reduce and this governance effect only significantly exists in non-state-owned listed companies.

摘要： 已有研究探讨了股利政策、债务杠杆等财务机制对高投资机会公司代理问题的治理效应,但鲜有研究关注独立审计机制对高投资机会公司代理问题和会计信息质量的影响。本文从盈余价值相关性的视角考察了高质量审计和投资机会对会计信息质量的综合影响，发现随着投资机会的增加上市公司盈余的价值相关性将显著下降，但若其聘请的是高质量审计师，则盈余价值相关性的下降幅度会有显著的降低且这一治理效应只在非国有上市公司中显著存在。