Abstract: his paper examines earnings management behavior of the listed A-Stock firms in Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period of CEO turnover, and the effect brought by different successor origin on earnings management. We find that CEO turnover and its successor origin have a significant effect on earnings management behavior. Specifically, our results contains four aspects, including: (1)Earnings management exists during the year of CEO turnover and next year, the firms of CEO turnover usually reduced profits through earnings management in the year of turnover, and then increase profit to meet the level of the previous year. (2)Compared to inside successors, outside successors make more negative earnings management in the year of turnover, while insider successors make more positive earnings management in next year. (3) The policy of earnings management is similar between successors from major shareholders and from firm inside. We do not find their earnings management significant differences in the year of turnover and next year. (4)However, the policy of earnings management is different between successors from manager market and from firm inside. The earnings management of the former in the year of turnover is more affected by last year, earnings management of the former in next year is less than that of the other two successors.

摘要： 本文以我国沪市A股发生CEO变更公司为对象，研究了CEO变更前后公司盈余管理程度的变化，以及不同继任者来源对其盈余管理程度的影响。研究发现CEO变更及其来源对盈余管理有显著影响，具体表现为：(1)CEO变更对企业盈余管理的影响主要体现在变更当年及次年，这类企业通常在变更当年进行负向盈余管理，调低利润；次年进行正向盈余管理，调高利润，并进而恢复到变更前一年的水平。(2)与内部人继任相比，外部人继任公司CEO时继任当年的负向盈余管理程度更大，利润降低的幅度更大；而内部人继任企业在继任次年的正向盈余管理程度更大，利润提高的幅度更大。(3)继任CEO来自大股东的企业与内部人继任企业的盈余管理政策类似，在CEO变更当年及其前年和次年中这两类企业的盈余管理程度没有显著差异。(4)继任CEO来自经理人市场的企业与内部继任企业的盈余管理政策不同。在变更当年，前者的盈余管理程度及其变化幅度受到上年的影响更大；在变更次年，前者的盈余管理程度的涨幅既比后者小一些，也比继任者来自大股东的企业小一些。