Abstract: Abstract: Many studies have shown that problem of social regulation is not is not under-investment, which is worth probing into the reason of. The article embarks from the longitudinal configuration of regulation right, and it adjust model of Fredriksson & Gaston (2000), analyzes and compares the result between centralization and decentralization of regulation right. The study has shown that both of centralization and decentralization of regulation right can achieve optimal equilibrium under certain assumptions. Combined with China's reality, this paper argues that revising objective function of local governments and dredging channels for expressing preferences from public are important factors to improve the effect of regulatory decision-making and implementation. On this basis, suggestions on reconstruction of Chinese social regulation system are given.

摘要： 摘 要：许多研究表明，社会性规制失效已不是简单的投入不足问题，其背后蕴藏的深刻动因值得我们探析，本文从规制权利的纵向配置出发，对Fredriksson & Gaston（2000）模型进行调整，分析并比较了规制集权与规制分权的均衡结果，并结合中国社会性规制现实分析造成社会性规制失效的可能动因。研究表明，在一定假设下，规制集权与分权都可以达到最优的均衡。结合中国社会性规制体制制度特征，本文认为，调整地方政府的目标函数及其行为，畅通公众偏好表达渠道是提高规制决策与实施效果的重要因素。在此基础上，给出了中国社会性规制体系完善的初步设想。关键词： 规制分权 ； 规制集权； 规制重构