Abstract: From the perspective of local deficit financing，this paper tries to expounds the internal logic between fiscal decentralization and local government’s land finance. Theoretical analysis shows that: fiscal decentralization in China aggravates local deficit financing, and the latter becomes an incentive for local governments to grab off-budgetary financial revenue, which will impel them to take active land finance strategy to increase local fiscal revenue. At the same time, our empirical test among them three using provincial panel data shows that fiscal decentralization and local deficit financing both have obvious positive driving effects on land finance.

摘要： 基于地方财政赤字的视角，研究财政分权与地方政府土地财政策略的内在作用逻辑。理论分析表明：中国式财政分权造成地方财政财政赤字的扩大化，财政赤字激励了地方政府在利益觉醒后利用预算制度缺口，用“扭曲之手”来攫取预算外财政收益，进而驱动地方政府实施积极的土地财政策略来实现财政增收的政策目标。省际面板数据的实证结果进一步验证了财政分权、地方财政赤字对土地财政的正向驱动作用。