Abstract: Using China's listing Corporation 2003-2011 data, the paper analyze the relation between the debt maturity and salaries of the listed company executives according to the maturity structure of debt. The results show that: (1) the management in the Chinese listed companies will use their power to extend debt maturity at the same time improve their remuneration; (2) compared to state-owned enterprises, we conclude that the managerial entrenchment may be severe in the non-state-owned enterprises; (3) the managerial entrenchment is more severe in the company which the manager is the chairman. Thus the improvement of executive incentive and payout policy should consider the managerial entrenchment.

摘要： 本文以债务期限结构为权衡指标，以我国深沪两市2003-2011年上市的588家公司为样本，实证研究我国上市公司债务期限结构与高管薪酬的关系。结果表明：（1）我国上市公司管理层存在着利用手中的权力在延长债务期限的同时提高自身薪酬的管理层防御行为；（2）与国有企业相比，非国有企业的管理层防御效应可能更严重；（3）总经理兼任董事长的企业管理层防御效应较不兼任的更严重。