Abstract: Sustainable growth of small and medium sized private listed companies has become a common concern in both theory and practice circle at this stage. Based on the enterprise growth theory and double agency analysis frame, a balanced panel data of 2007~2011 China's small and medium-sized private listed companies is used in this paper, and the relationships between executive equity incentive, double agency cost and company growth are tested by empirical methods. We find that executive equity incentive indeed has a negative effect on Agency Cost I, but it can not influence Agency Cost II significantly. At the same time equity incentives can promote the growth of private listed SMEs, but this is achieved by the entire mediation effect of Agency Cost I. But the mediation effect of agency Cost II is not obvious.

摘要： 民营中小企业的可持续成长问题是现阶段理论界与实践界共同关注的焦点。基于内部因素成长理论与双重委托代理分析框架，以2007-2011年中国民营中小上市公司的平衡面板数据为样本，深入探讨高管股权激励对民营中小企业成长的影响机理，研究表明：高管股权激励能够有效抑制股东与管理层之间的第一类代理成本，但对于由控股股东与中小股东利益冲突而形成的第二类代理成本并没有显著影响；同时第一类代理成本在高管股权激励与民营中小企业成长之间具有显著的中介效应，即股权激励以抑制第一类代理成本为影响路径对民营中小企业成长产生促进效应，但第二类代理成本的中介效应并未显现。