Abstract: We explored the influence of venture capital (VC) syndication on corporate governance of entrepreneurial firms from the perspective of board governance structure and the sensitivity of executive compensation on performance. Results show that VC syndicate-backed firms have a higher proportion of professional directors on the Boards, greater sensitivity of executive compensation on performance, as compared to individual VC-backed firms. The more the involved VC firms are, the higher the proportion of professional directors on the entrepreneurial firms’ Boards is, and the greater sensitivity of executive compensation on performance is. This means that, VC syndication can improve board governance structure and executive compensation contracts of entrepreneurial firms, and thereby raise the level of corporate governance. To correct the bias due to endogeneity in VC syndication, we also ran two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions and the results are similar to ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions.

摘要： 本文从董事会治理结构和高管薪酬业绩敏感性两方面探讨联合投资对被投资企业公司治理的影响。研究发现，与单独投资支持的公司相比，联合投资支持的公司董事会中专业董事比例更高，高管薪酬业绩敏感性更高；参与同一家企业投资的风投机构家数越多，被投资公司董事会中专业董事比例越高，高管薪酬业绩敏感性越高。这说明，相对于单独投资而言，风险资本联合投资能进一步改善被投资企业的董事会治理结构和高管薪酬契约，从而更能提升被投资企业的公司治理水平。为了纠正联合投资内生性引起的估计偏误，本文还采用了2SLS分析方法，分析结果与OLS结果一致。