Abstract: This paper analyzes the behavior mechanism and its expense effect of the county hospital with the regulatory constraint by modeling the medical behavior of the hospital under drug-proportion regulation ,and carries an empirical analysis on the quarterly Panel-Data of 180 county hospitals in Zhejiang Province. On this foundation, the paper makes a further discussion on the patient's welfare under the regulation with the help of patients' medical utility function, which has a feature of satiation.The research shows that:(1) The drug consumption and it’s expenditure of outpatients decreases under the regulation of the drug-proportion, and the more strict the regulation is, the less the drug expense is; (2) Drug-proportion regulation creates an new induced inspection demand : the average inspection volume of outpatient increases gradually as regulation goes from strength to strength, and it won't reduce until reaching its maximum, and the inspection volume after regulation really exceeds that before; (3) Patients' medical expense per diagnosis cuts somewhat, and the more severe the regulation is, the less the expense is;(4) When the intensity of regulation is minor, the seriousness of overdose will slow down, but the patient also fall into the predicament of excessive inspection and over-prescription, as a result, the patient's welfare is possibly to increase or decrease. When the intensity become serious, regulation will definitely lead to a strait in which excessive inspection coexists with insufficient drug, so patients' welfare is very likely to be slashed because of regulation.

摘要： 本文构建了一个药占比管制下的医院医疗行为模型，分析管制约束下县级医院的医疗行为机制及其费用效应，并利用浙江省180家县级医院的分季度面板数据进行实证分析；在此基础上，借助具有餍足特征的患者医疗效用函数，对患者的管制福利效应作进一步讨论。研究发现：（1）药占比管制下门诊患者药品消费量及药品支出有所减少，且管制强度越大，药品支出越少；（2）药占比管制造成了新的检查需求诱导：均次门诊检查量随管制强度的增大而增加，直到最大值后才会有所减少，但其数额仍然大于管制前数额；（3）药占比管制下门诊患者均次医疗费用有所减少,且管制强度越高均次医疗费用越小；（4）当药占比管制强度较小时，过度用药程度有所减缓，但患者会陷于检查与用药双重过度的境地，其福利可能增加也可能减少。当管制强度稍大时，管制必将导致过度检查与用药不足并存，患者福利极有可能因管制而减少。