Abstract: Based on the restriction of illegal goods, the paper analyzes the administrative effects and efficiency of enforcement spending on regulation through a model of private lending market. Research shows that: because of the lack of formal financial, the demand of folk lending is inelastic as a commodity. Therefore, strengthened efforts of government to enforce private lending will bring huge social cost. As a conclusion, when demand of folk capital is relatively inelastic, it is not suitable for government to take direct measures to control and enforce, to legitimize and collect tax will be a more appropriate means. In reality, the financial comprehensive reform in Wenzhou tends to regulate private lending through establishing a folk loan registration service center. But when it comes to tax policy, the operational problem that who will be taxed must be solved.

摘要： 本文通过构建一个民间借贷规制模型来分析需求弹性和行政执法成本对规制效率的影响。模型表明：在民间借贷缺乏需求弹性的情况下，由于高昂的禁令规制成本，对政府而言更为合适的手段是将民间借贷采取合法化、并加以征税的规制政策。在我国，除了通过“民间借贷服务中心”等机构创新来实现民间金融规范化以外，更主要地是打破金融机构市场准入高度管控的体制，允许民间资本进入金融业，使民间金融机构合法化。