›› 2015, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (3): 105-112.

Previous Articles    

Equilibrium Model of Local Government Environmental Regulation under Chinese Style Decentralization

  

  • Received:2014-09-10 Revised:2014-11-04 Online:2015-03-10 Published:2015-03-02

中国式分权下的地方政府环境规制均衡模型

潘峰 西宝 王琳   

  1. 哈尔滨工业大学
  • 通讯作者: 潘峰
  • 基金资助:

    国家社会科学基金重点项目:中国城市化过程与区域协调发展研究;国家自然科学基金:跨功能边界关键基础设施网间失效的连锁效应建模与仿真

Abstract: The equilibrium model of local government environmental regulation is established based on the Stigler-Peltzman model of interest group theory of regulation under Chinese style decentralization. The implementation equilibrium of environmental regulation is studied based on the formulation equilibrium of environmental regulation as a benchmark. The influencing factors of implementation equilibrium of environmental regulation are analyzed. The results show that the departure from implementation equilibrium to formulation equilibrium in environmental regulation is theoretical basis for the environmental regulation failure, and the deviation degree represents the severity of regulation failure. The implementation equilibrium of environmental regulation is affected by the weight coefficient of environmental quality index and economic growth index in achievement assessment system, and the influence coefficient of corporate profits to economic income of local government. The reduction of departure from implementation equilibrium to formulation equilibrium is possible approach to prompt the implementation of local government environmental regulation.

摘要: 基于政府规制利益集团理论的Stigler-Peltzman模型,结合中国式分权的制度背景,建立了地方政府环境规制均衡模型,以环境规制的制定均衡为基准着重考察了环境规制的执行均衡,分析了环境规制执行均衡的影响因素。研究结果表明,环境规制执行均衡与制定均衡的偏离可以作为一类环境规制失灵问题的理论依据,偏离程度代表了规制失灵的严重程度。地方政府政绩考核体系中经济增长指标的权重系数、环境指标的权重系数以及企业利润对地方政府经济收益的影响系数,都会对环境规制的执行均衡产生影响。缩小规制执行均衡与制定均衡的偏离,是促使地方政府高效执行环境规制的可能途径。

CLC Number: