›› 2015, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (4): 89-96.
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章丹
通讯作者:
基金资助:
新兴市场国家中企业竞合关系对创新绩效的影响与对策研究——基于知识产权保护机制的分析;核心企业网络能力对产业技术创新战略联盟创新 绩效的影响机理研究;浙江民营上市公司股权集中度对技术创新的影响研究—— 基于公司治理机制交互作用视角的分析
Abstract: There are different results of the impact of ownership concentration on the R&D from both practical and theoretical view and 2009-2012 dynamic panel data is collected. The results showed that: (1)compared with the principal-agent, the principal-principal is more serious in the Chinese listed company. Therefore improving the concentration of ownership will not only reduce the current year's R&D investment, but also with the increase of concentration of ownership, current year's R&D investment decreased faster and faster, which will continue into next year, but the impact will be less than the first year.(2) with the increase of the market value of the company (i.e. the greater Tobin's Q), the negative impact of ownership concentration on R&D investment will reduce; with the increase of the company's cash flow, the negative of ownership concentration on R&D will increase; the type of industry have no impact on the relationship of ownership concentration and R&D investment.
Key words: R&, D
摘要: 针对我国上市公司股权集中对研发投资的影响在现实和理论中均存在不同表现的现状,基于双重委托代理理论,收集2009—2012年上市公司动态面板数据进行分析。研究结果表明:(1)中国上市公司中股东和经理人之间的委托代理矛盾与大股东和中小股东之间的委托委托矛盾相比较而言,后者比前者更为严重。因此,提高当年的股权集中度不仅会降低当年的研发投资,而且随着股权集中度的增加,当年研发投资降低的速度越来越快,这种影响会持续到第二年,但是影响程度会低于第一年;(2)随着公司市场价值的增加(即:托宾Q越大),股权集中度对研发投资的负向影响程度会降低;随着公司现金流的增加,股权集中度对研发投资的负向影响程度会增加;不同行业中股权集中度对研发投资的影响并没有显著的差异性。
CLC Number:
F273.11
章丹. 双重委托代理理论视角下股权集中与研发投资间关系研究——基于托宾Q、现金流和行业调节效应的分析[J]. 财经论丛, 2015, 31(4): 89-96.
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https://cjlc.zufe.edu.cn/EN/Y2015/V31/I4/89