Abstract: Abstract: This paper takes abnormal audit fees as the proxy of audit collusion and utilizes empirical method to test whether analysts can detect audit collusion. The research has found that the following number of analysts will be significantly reduced with the increase of abnormal audit fees, which indicates that analysts can perceive the risk brought by audit collusion and give the market information by stopping following. Further study has also found that analysts are more sensitive to abnormal audit fees of the companies listed for a long time and the private enterprises, thus resulting in the dramatic decline of analysts following number.

摘要： 摘 要：以异常审计收费作为审计合谋的代理变量，研究分析师是否能发现审计合谋行为。研究发现，分析师跟踪人数会随异常审计费用的增加而显著减少，这说明分析师能觉察到审计合谋可能带来的风险，并通过放弃跟踪该公司的方式向市场传递信息；进一步研究发现，分析师对上市时间较长的公司，以及民营上市公司的异常审计费用更为敏感，跟踪数量下降较为明显。