Abstract: The guarantee circle becomes one problem to negatively affect corporate performance and regional economic development and it makes some theoretical and practical senses to investigating how it forms. This paper utilizes the guarantee data from listed firms to form the guarantee circle data and investigate the reason for the formation of guarantee circle. Results show that when the promotion incentive is larger or the financial marketization level is higher, firms are more prone to join in the guarantee circle. Furthermore, when expropriation risk of block shareholders is higher, the above-mentioned effect is larger. Promotion incentives mainly affect the state-owned firms while financial marketization level mainly affect the non-state-owned firms. This paper uncovers the mechanism for formation of guarantee circle, and has some implications for enhancing credit resources allocation efficiency through deepening reform and improving corporate governance.

摘要： 近年来，担保圈现象成为影响公司稳健运行和区域经济发展的一大问题，对于其形成机理的研究具有一定的理论和现实意义。本文生成了上市公司担保圈数据以研究这一问题。结果发现，晋升激励越大、金融市场化水平越低，企业加入担保圈的可能性越大。控股股东的侵占风险越高，晋升激励和金融市场化水平影响担保圈形成的作用更强。晋升激励主要影响国企加入担保圈的行为，而金融市场化水平主要影响非国有企业加入担保圈的行为。本文揭示了担保圈的形成机理，对于新常态下通过深化改革、完善治理提升信贷资源配置效率具有一定的启示。