Abstract: The article is based on the responsibility system framework of incomplete information theory, in view of the regulator, the original food manufacturer, the new food manufacturer and the consumer, and step by step to decompose the behavior and analyze the earnings of multipartite subjects, and tear down the constraint and the equilibrium in the optimal food safety level. The study founds that, the government have to keep the objective and fair regulation for both the new food manufacturer and original food manufacturer, both several reward and punishment, and have to control the extent of regulation. To improve the food qualified percent of the original(new) food manufacturer is a key move to enhance the consumer’s satisfaction, payment willingness and food consumption scale. At the same time, keeping the effectiveness on market, government regulation and information transfer are premise to increase the 4 subjects’ revenue. The food price, the food safety level and consumer’s expected utility have positive correlation between the original food manufacturer and new food manufacturer, in addition, the food price, the food safety level and the food detection accuracy have positive correlation too.

摘要： 基于不完全信息理论下责任制度分析框架，从规制者、原有食品厂商、新增食品厂商和消费者的四方博弈出发，逐步分解模型中多方博弈主体的行为、收益以及最优食品安全水平下的约束条件和均衡解。 研究发现: 政府在把握规制的度的情况下，食品厂商类别、规制次数对于政府客观公正的监管规制无影响。提高不同食品厂商的食品合格率是增加消费者满意度、支付意愿以及食品消费规模的关键举措。同时，保障政府监管和信息传递的有效性是四方博弈主体收益增加的前提。原有食品厂商和新增食品厂商之间在食品价格、食品质量以及消费者期望效用方面存在正相关关系。