›› 2016, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 38-46.

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Lack of Investor Protection and Destructive Growth: Theoretical Analysis and Its Demonstration

  

  • Received:2015-09-14 Revised:2016-03-31 Online:2016-06-10 Published:2016-06-06
  • Supported by:

    Chinese Postdoctoral Science Foundation

投资者保护不足与企业破坏性成长:理论与实证

王韧 马红旗   

  1. 重庆工商大学财政金融学院
  • 通讯作者: 王韧
  • 基金资助:

    中国博士后科学基金

Abstract: Efficiency of micro enterprise financing and investing is the key to the economic transformation, but the destructive growth of Chinese enterprises is a puzzle. IN view of the limitation of modern financing structure theory in explaining this phenomenon, this paper tries to start from perspective of institutional analysis, attempts to introduce the latest research results of the micro law and finance, constructs a theoretical framework from the lack of investor protection, to corporate investment and financing behavior distortion, to destructive growth finally, and gives empirical research based on literature review and related data of domestic listing corporation. The results show that there is a relatively obvious lack of investor protection in China, the resulting enterprise over investment and low investment efficiency resulted in the deviation of enterprise size expansion and efficiency improvement that is what is called destructive growth. On the basis of these, economic transformation also need to pay attention to the micro system correction, such as improving the investor protection mechanism, standardizing corporate investing and financing behaviors, which is conducive to the smooth transition of economic system.

摘要: 微观投融资效率是经济成功转型的关键。但国内企业的“破坏性成长”现象对此形成困扰。鉴于现代融资结构理论在解释这一问题时的局限性,本论文引入微观法与金融学的研究成果,构建了一个从投资者保护不足,到企业投融资行为扭曲,最终衍生为破坏性成长的理论解释框架,并基于国内外相关文献综述和国内上市公司数据进行了实证检验,结果显示国内投资者保护程度明显不足,由此造成的企业过度投资和投资效率低下引发规模扩张和效益提升的背离,也就是所谓的破坏性成长。由此,经济转型也需要关注微观层面的制度校正,通过完善投资者保护机制最终约束微观主体的投融资行为,提高资金配置效率。

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