›› 2016, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 58-66.

Previous Articles     Next Articles

CEO Tenure, Board Governance and Performance-Forced Turnover Sensibility

  

  • Received:2015-11-09 Revised:2016-03-16 Online:2016-06-10 Published:2016-06-06

CEO任期、董事会治理与绩效强制变更敏感性

李济含1,刘淑莲2,朱明园2   

  1. 1. 东北财经大学
    2. 东北财经大学会计学院
  • 通讯作者: 李济含

Abstract: Based on A-share listed companies in main board of Shanghai and Shenzhen, China stock exchange in 2010-2014 and the 1341 cases of CEO turnover events during this period as the initial sample, after filtering the sample, applying the Logit model and OLS model research CEO tenure impact on the sensitivity of corporate performance and CEO forced turnover, and from the angle of the board of directors governance, further explain the reason of the sensitivity to change. The research results show that, in CEO tenure, the sensitivity of corporate performance and CEO forced turnover, as well as the monitoring intensity of the board of directors are significantly reduced. The results reveal that the tenure is an important identity to recognize ability of CEO, and the board governance mechanism reflects shareholders supervising CEO and demanding for relevant information.

摘要: 本文以2010-2014年我国沪深A股主板上市公司以及在此期间的1341例CEO变更事件为初始研究样本,采用Logit模型和OLS模型研究CEO任期对公司绩效与CEO强制变更敏感性的影响,并从董事会治理视角,进一步说明敏感性产生变化的原因。研究发现,随着CEO任期逐渐延长,公司绩效与CEO强制变更的敏感性、以及董事会的监督力度均显著降低。研究结论揭示了任期是识别CEO能力的重要标识,以及董事会治理机制能够反映股东监督CEO并获取相关信息的需求。

CLC Number: