Abstract: This article uses a-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014 as the research object, and empirically tests the relationship among CEO power, auditor choice, audit fee. Study found: (1) the greater the CEO power, the less tendency to choose the "big four", and more likely to choose domestic big offices ; (2) the greater the CEO power, the more likely they pay lower audit expense; (3) in the control of self-selection, the CEO power of listed company effects on audit expense is not obvious in the “big four” audit, and the CEO power of listed companies is significantly negative in the comprehensive ranking top ten 10 audit and the domestic top 10 audit. It suggests that the audit bargaining power of domestic large offices is not strong, the strategy of "bigger and stronger" has a long way to go.

摘要： 本文以2007-2014年A股上市公司为研究对象，实证检验了CEO控制权、事务所选择与审计公费之间的关系。研究发现：（1）CEO控制权越大，越不倾向选择“四大”，而更倾向选择本土大所；（2）CEO控制权越大，越倾向支付降低的审计公费；（3）控制了事务所自选择后，由“四大”审计的上市公司CEO控制权对审计公费的影响不明显，而由综合排名十大和本土十大审计的上市公司CEO控制权与审计公费显著负相关。