›› 2016, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (7): 30-39.

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Fiscal Decentralization: Transfer Payment, Tax Preferences and the Expand of Primary City

  

  • Received:2016-01-05 Revised:2016-05-09 Online:2016-07-10 Published:2016-07-08

财政分权:转移支付、税收优惠与首位城市增长

田超   

  1. 武汉大学中国中部发展研究院
  • 通讯作者: 田超
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目“中国经济结构与经济发展方式转变研究”

Abstract: A series of changes in provincial regional economic disparities have occurred due to adjustment in fiscal rights caused by China’s fiscal decentralization. Under the background of fiscal decentralization, this article analyzes the impact of transfer payment and tax preferences on the scale of primary city through a spatial panel model, using the data of China's 27 provinces from 2000 to 2012. Results show that government transfer payment policy is inefficient for the suppression of the primary city’s growth as well as the balance of regional development. The higher financial dependence on central government is, the larger primary city is, and provincial government’s bias of transfer payments towards peripheral areas cannot prevent primary city’s expansion. In addition, primary city is able to take the advantage of tax preferences policy to further enlarge its scale. On this basis, this paper presents appropriate proposals for fiscal policies and city development.

摘要: 中国的财政分权所带来的财权调整使得各省区地区间的经济发展差距发生一系列变化。本文基于中国27个省区2000-2012年的数据样本,通过构建空间面板模型研究了财政分权背景下转移支付和税收优惠对于首位城市规模增长的影响。结果显示,政府的转移支付政策对于抑制首位城市规模增加,平衡区域发展缺乏效率:对于中央政府财政依赖度越高的省区,其首位城市规模规模越大;省级政府对于外围城市偏向性的转移支付政策无法有效阻止首位城市的扩张。另外,首位城市能够借助相对优惠的税收政策进一步扩大规模范围。在此基础上,本文提出了相应的财政政策以及城市发展的建议。

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