Previous Articles     Next Articles

Incentive Effect and Recognition Mechanism of Government Innovation Subsidy——Based on Micro Enterprise Data

LI Yongyou, YE Qianwen   

  1. School of Finance and Taxation, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics, Hangzhou 310018, China
  • Received:2017-03-28 Online:2017-12-10 Published:2017-12-10

政府科技创新补贴的激励效应及其机制识别——基于企业微观数据的经验研究

李永友,叶倩雯   

  1. 浙江财经大学财政税务学院,浙江 杭州 310018
  • 作者简介:李永友(1970-),男,安徽和县人,浙江财经大学财政税务学院教授,博士;叶倩雯(1995-),女,浙江台州人,浙江财经大学财政税务学院学生。
  • 基金资助:

    国家社科基金重大招标项目(15ZDA016)

Abstract:

In order to build an innovation-driven economic pattern and reinvigorate the economic growth, government has invested a large amount of financial subsidies to innovative enterprises. Will this subsidy policy stimulate the innovation of enterprises? Basing on the micro data of small and mid-sized enterprises published by the State Ministry of Science and Technology and data from China's industrial enterprise database, the article aims to research the incentive effect and recognition mechanism of government innovation subsidy. Conclusion confirms that the government's direct financial subsidies on science and technology enterprises fail to lead to more innovations and output, mostly due to the crowding-out effect of R&D investment and the false "innovation signal" transmitted by companies to swindle financial subsidy.

Key words: R&D Subsidy, Innovation Incentives, Two-step Decision, Mechanism to Identify

摘要:

为实现创新驱动,重塑经济增长新动力,政府对创新型企业投入大量财政补贴。那么,政府科技创新补贴政策会带来企业创新行为吗?本文基于国家科技部公布的科技型中小企业微观数据和中国工业企业数据,对政府科技创新补贴政策的激励效应及其实现机制进行研究。结论证实,政府对科技型企业的直接财政补贴并没有激励企业更多的创新行为和创新产出。研究发现,获得科技补贴的创新型企业实际上有两种类型行为反应,一种类型反应是,获得补贴的企业没有实施任何创新活动,这部分所谓科技型创新企业更多是通过虚假“创新信号”骗取科技型创新企业认定和财政补助;另一种类型反应是,企业的确实施了创新活动,但这种创新活动或创新产出与政府创新补贴无关,不仅如此,政府创新补贴与企业创新产值甚至还产生了显著挤出效应。

关键词: R&D补贴, 创新激励, 两步决策, 机制识别

CLC Number: