Which Roles Do Independent Directors Play in Chinese Listed Firms?——The Market Perception of Independent Directors' Resignation in Chinese Listed Firms

Abstract

Abstract: Based on the market perception of independent directors' resignation in Chinese listed firms,this paper studies which roles independent directors play in Chinese listed firms. It is found that after controlling the resources background of independent directors in listed firms, there is no difference between the market reaction to the resignation of independent directors with more agency cost and with less agency cost, which shows that the independent directors do not play the role of “governance and supervision”. This paper divides independent directors' resource background into two kinds: “political relationships” resource and “non-political relationships” resource, and finds that the market reacts negatively to the resignation of these two kinds of independent directors,which shows that the independent directors play the role of “resource supporting”. Furthermore,this paper finds that the listed firms need independent directors with local political relationship and with enterprise management experience mostly. This paper can provide a reference for the decisions of CSRC and investors.

null

Key words: Independent Directors, Supervision, Resource Supporting, Market Reaction

摘要： 本文基于中国上市公司独立董事辞职的市场感知的视角,探讨中国上市公司独立董事的实际作用。研究发现,在控制上市公司独立董事的“资源”背景后,代理问题较大的上市公司独立董事辞职的市场反应与代理问题较小的上市公司独立董事辞职的市场反应并无显著差异。说明了独立董事并没有发挥“治理监督”的作用。而同时,具有“政治关系”资源和“非政治关系”资源的独立董事辞职,市场反应都显著为负,说明了独立董事发挥了“资源支持”的作用。进一步地,本文发现上市公司最需要的是具有地方政治关系和企业实际管理经历的独立董事。本文结论能为证监会的监管和投资者的决策提供一定的借鉴参考。

关键词: 独立董事, 监督, 资源支持, 市场反应

CLC Number:

F830.91

LEI Qianhua, LUO Danglun, CHEN Huili. Which Roles Do Independent Directors Play in Chinese Listed Firms?——The Market Perception of Independent Directors' Resignation in Chinese Listed Firms[J]. , 2017, 33(4): 61-70.

雷倩华, 罗党论, 陈晖丽. 上市公司独立董事发挥怎样的作用？——中国上市公司独立董事辞职市场感知的视角[J]. 财经论丛, 2017, 33(4): 61-70.

References

[1]胡勤勤, 沈艺峰. 独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济, 2002: 55-62.
[2]支晓强, 童盼. 盈余管理、控制权转移与独立董事变更[J].管理世界, 2005, (11): 137-144.
[3]刘浩, 唐松, 楼俊. 独立董事: 监督还是咨询?——银行背景独立董事对企业信贷融资影响研究[J].管理世界, 2012, (1): 141-156.
[4]Harris, M., and RavivA.. A Theory of Board Control and Size[J].Review of Financial Studies, 2008, 21: 1797-1833.
[5]醋卫华. 独立董事的价值: 来自独立董事集中辞职的证据[J].经济管理, 2015, (03): 56-66.
[6]邓晓飞, 辛宇, 滕飞. 官员独立董事强制辞职与政治关联丧失[J].中国工业经济, 2016, (02): 130-145.
[7]Fama E. F. , and Jensen M. C.. Separation of Ownership and Control[J].Journal of Law and Economics, 1983, 26: 301-326.
[8]叶康涛, 陆正飞, 张志华. 独立董事能否抑制大股东的“掏空”?[J].经济研究, 2007, (4): 101-111.
[9]叶康涛, 祝继高, 陆正飞. 独立董事的独立性: 基于董事会投票的证据[J].经济研究, 2011, (1): 126-139.
[10]唐清泉, 罗党论, 王莉. 大股东的隧道挖掘与制衡力量——来自中国市场的经验证据[J].中国会计评论, 2005, (1): 63-86.
[11]Bhagat S. and Black B. The Uncertain Relationship between Board Composition and Firm Performance[J].Business Lawyer, 1999, 54: 921-963
[12]Yermack D. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors[J].Journal of Financial Economics, 1996, 40(2): 185–211.
[13]Kiang, Nelson. GUANXI (The Art of Relationships): Microsoft, China, and Bill Gates's Plan to Win the Road Ahead[M].New York: Simon and Sehuster, Inc. 2006.
[14]魏刚, 肖泽忠, Nick Travlos, 邹宏. 独立董事背景与公司经营绩效[J].经济研究, 2007, (3): 92-105.
[15]贺建刚, 魏明海, 刘峰. 利益输送、媒体监督与公司治理: 五粮液案例研究[J].管理世界, 2008, (10): 141-150.
[16]尚兆燕. 独立董事法律责任的中国实践——来自证监会对上市公司处罚的经验证据[J].山西财经大学学报, 2010, (03): 105-111.
[17]罗党论, 刘晓龙. 政治关系、进入壁垒与企业绩效——来自中国民营上市公司的经验证据[J].管理世界, 2009, (5): 97-106.
[18]孙亮, 刘春. 公司为什么聘请异地独立董事?[J].管理世界, 2014, (9): 131-142.
[19]Pfeffer, J. and G. R. Salancik. The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective[M].New York: Harper and Row, 1978.
[20]Pfeffer, J. Size and Composition of Corporate Boards of Directors[J].Administrative Science Quarterly, 1972, 17: 218-229.
[21]Williamson, O. E. Corporate Governance[J].Yale law Journal, 1984, 93: 1197-1230.
[22]Singh J., Tucker D., House R. Organizational Legitimacy and the Liability of Newness[J].Administrative Science Quarterly, 1986, 31(2): 171-193.
[23]Selznick P. TVA and the Grass Roots[M].Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949.
[24]Baysinger B, Hoskisson R. E. The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy[J].Academy of Management Review, 1990, 15(1): 72-87.
[25]Lorsch, J.W., and MacIver, E. The reality of America's corporate boards[M].Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989.
[26]Haunschild P. R., Beckman C. M. When Do Interlocks Matter?: Alternate Sources of Information and Interlock Influence[J].Administrative Science Quarterly, 1998, 43(4): 815-844.
[27]吴文峰, 吴冲锋, 刘晓薇. 中国民营上市公司高管的政府背景与公司价值[J].经济研究, 2008, (7): 130-141.
[28]陈运森, 谢德仁. 网络位置、独立董事治理与投资效率[J].管理世界, 2011, (7): 113-127.
[29]胡元木. 技术独立董事可以提高R&D产出效率吗?——来自中国证券市场的研究[J].南开管理评论, 2012, 15(2): 136-142.
[30]Biddle, G., Hilary, G., and Verdi, R. S. How does Financial Reporting Quality Relate to Investment Efficiency[J].Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2009,81: 112-131.