CEO Gender,Property Rights and Excessive Investment Behavior

›› 2018, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (4): 66-74.

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CEO Gender,Property Rights and Excessive Investment Behavior

XU Xiaofang¹, WO Jian², FANG Lve³

1. School of Economics and Management, East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330013,China;
2. Dongfang College, Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Haining 314408,China;
3. International School, East China Jiaotong University,Nanchang 330013,China

Received:2017-11-03 Online:2018-04-10 Published:2018-04-13

CEO性别、产权性质与公司过度投资行为

许晓芳¹, 沃健², 方略³

1.华东交通大学经济管理学院,江西南昌 330013;
2.浙江财经大学东方学院,浙江海宁 314408;
3.华东交通大学国际学院,江西南昌 330013

作者简介:许晓芳(1986-),女,江西石城人,华东交通大学经济管理学院讲师,博士;沃健(1960-),男,浙江绍兴人,浙江财经大学东方学院教授;方略(1985-),男,安徽南陵人,华东交通大学国际学院讲师。
基金资助:
江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ150515;GJJ170426);江西省社会科学规划项目(16ZK02);教育部人文社科青年项目(17YJC630190)

Abstract

Abstract: As the top decision makers of companies,CEOs control resource allocation rights and the core investment decision-making rights,and the gender will have an important impact on corporate investment behavior as one of the most important personal characteristics. Based on the data of Chinese A-share listed companies,this paper studies the impact of CEO gender on company's excessive investment behavior. It is found that female CEOs can reduce the degree of excessive investment in state-owned listed companies to a certain extent,but no evidence shows that female CEOs can reduce that of non-state-owned listed companies. Furthermore,there is no evidence that CEO gender can have an important impact on company's over-investment tendency. This paper expands the research on the executive background characteristics and corporate investment behavior research,and has important theoretical and practical implications for the understanding of company's excessive investment behavior by executives of different gender,and the impact of different property rights system on microscopic main bodies' economic behaviors,as well as the impact of the gender of executives on individual economic behaviors.

Key words: CEO Gender, Property Rights , Excessive Investment Behavior

摘要： CEO作为公司最高决策者,控制着资源配置权及处于核心地位的投资决策权,性别作为其最重要的个人特征之一,会对公司投资行为产生重要影响。本文基于中国A股上市公司样本数据,研究CEO性别对公司过度投资行为的影响,结果显示,女性CEO可以在一定程度上降低国有上市公司的过度投资程度。同时,CEO性别未对公司的过度投资倾向产生重要影响。本文拓展了现有高管背景特征和公司投资行为方面的研究,对于认识公司不同性别高管的过度投资行为,以及不同产权制度对微观主体或个体经济行为的影响,均具有重要的理论与现实意义。

关键词: CEO性别, 产权性质, 过度投资行为

CLC Number:

C939
F230

XU Xiaofang, WO Jian, FANG Lve. CEO Gender,Property Rights and Excessive Investment Behavior[J]. , 2018, 34(4): 66-74.

许晓芳, 沃健, 方略. CEO性别、产权性质与公司过度投资行为[J]. 财经论丛, 2018, 34(4): 66-74.

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CEO Gender,Property Rights and Excessive Investment Behavior

CEO性别、产权性质与公司过度投资行为

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