Abstract: Based on the perspective of local government environmental regulation competition and in view of China's system of fiscal decentralization and political centralization,this paper uses Chinese 2001～2010 provincial panel data to inspect local governments‘policy choices in environmental regulation competition and the effect on haze pollution, Game analysis shows that local governments make policy choices through weighing their benefits and costs of environmental regulation.Spatial panel Durbin model regression results show that local governments will make the differentiation strategy choice in the environmental regulation competition, with the continuous adjustment of the central government's performance evaluation system. It has a certain inhibitory effect on haze pollution, affirming the positive effect of environmental regulation policies and fiscal decentralization on haze pollution.Therefore, it is imperative to improve and strengthen the diversification of performance evaluation system, clarify the division of powers between the central and local governments infinance and expenditure responsibilities, define clear relationship of responsibility and authority, set pollution reduction targets and develop regulatory assessment methods according to the local conditions.

Key words: Local Government Competition, Fiscal Decentralization, Environmental Regulation, Haze Pollution

摘要： 本文利用中国2001～2010年省级面板数据,基于地方政府的环境规制竞争视角,结合我国财政分权和政治集权的体制,考察地方政府间环境规制竞争的策略选择行为及对雾霾污染的作用。静态博弈分析表明,地方政府通过权衡自身的环境规制收益与成本进行策略选择。空间面板杜宾模型的回归结果显示,随着中央政绩考核体系的不断调整,地方政府在环境规制的竞争中采取“差异化”的策略选择,对雾霾污染具有一定的抑制作用,肯定环境规制政策与财政分权对治理雾霾污染的积极效果。为此,应继续完善并加强多元化的政绩考核体系,厘清中央与地方财政事权及支出责任的划分,明确清晰的责权关系,因地制宜制定治污减排目标和监管考核办法。

关键词: 地方政府竞争, 财政分权, 环境规制, 雾霾污染