Pollution Control Effect of Local Government's Environmental Regulation Strategy:Mechanism and Empirical Test

Abstract

Abstract: In view of the fact that China's environmental regulation policies are mainly formulated by local governments, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of environmental regulation strategies among local governments, and validates the pollution control effect of environmental regulation strategies among local governments by using the provincial data and the spatial self-lagging model. It is found that there are two equilibrium points of “race to bottom” and “race to top” in the implementation of environmental regulation strategy by local governments through weighing costs and benefits. The results of the empirical tests are as follows: Increasing the intensity of environmental regulation by local governments can significantly reduce the regional pollution emissions, and trigger the near transfer of pollution;The pollution control effect of local government environmental regulation is gradually strengthened from east to west, while the pollution transfer effect is gradually weakened from east to west; The compensation effect of innovation is the main way to promote the transformation of environmental regulation strategies among local governments from “Race to Bottom” to “Race to Top”.

Key words: Environmental Regulation, Pollution Control, Evolutionary Game, Spatial Econometric

摘要： 针对中国环境规制政策主要由地方政府负责的特点,本文构建地方政府间环境规制策略的演化博弈模型,运用中国省级数据和空间自滞后模型,验证地方政府间环境规制策略的污染治理效应。研究结果显示,地方政府通过权衡成本和收益实施环境规制策略,存在“逐底竞争”和“趋好竞争”两个均衡点;地方政府提高环境规制强度能明显降低本地区的污染排放,但会引发污染的就近转移;地方政府环境规制的污染治理效应由东向西逐渐增强,而污染转移效应则由东向西逐渐减弱;创新补偿效应是推动地方政府间环境规制策略由“逐底竞争”向“趋好竞争”转变的主要方式。

关键词: 环境规制, 污染治理, 演化博弈, 空间计量

CLC Number:

F124.3

LU Lijun, CHEN Danbo. Pollution Control Effect of Local Government's Environmental Regulation Strategy:Mechanism and Empirical Test[J]. , 2019, 35(12): 104-113.

陆立军, 陈丹波. 地方政府间环境规制策略的污染治理效应：机制与实证[J]. 财经论丛, 2019, 35(12): 104-113.

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